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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

INSTITUTIONAL LENDING MODELS, MISSION DRIFT,
AND MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS

In the economic development community, microfinance is a tool used to reduce
poverty among extremely poor households. Impoverished households can access banking
services such as credit, savings, and insurance through microfinance institutions (MFIs),
which can be used to create a new business, smooth household consumption, fund
medical emergencies, etc. With this basic institutional objective in mind, much of the
literature surrounding microbanking services is pointing to a drift in the mission of MFIs
from providing credit to extremely poor households (welfarist approach) to one centered
on creating a sustainable financial institution that serve the subsistence poor
(institutionalist approach) within MFIs.
Using MIXMarket data on specific MFIs (n = 2,251) in developing and transition
economies (n = 118) between 1995 and 2011, a comparison of outreach measures
(average loan balance) and sustainability (organizational efficiency) of these institutions
by charter type will be performed through a series of four, fixed effects regression
models. The main research question is: given that a positive, overall shift in average loan
balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, how does this impact microfinance
institutions and the demographics they target on the intensive and extensive margins?
These analyses will test the theory that MFIs with larger average loan balances serve
households closer to the subsistence poverty level, as opposed to the core poor, which
manifests as mission drift toward the institutionalist philosophy of lending.
The phenomenon of mission drift directly impacts the outcomes of microfinance
institutions which is linked to the level of poverty of households served. The results of
this study indicate the mission of these organizations is drifting toward the institutionalist
philosophy of lending. With this general result, mission drift can be observed within both
the internal and external margins of the microfinance industry, which influences the
chosen target market, profit, and structure of MFIs, as determined by the mission of the
organization. The MFIs included in this sample are lending larger amounts to clients
across time, targeting high end and small business clients, and are entering into the

market as non-banking financial institutions and banks as opposed to non-government
organizations.
KEYWORDS: microfinance; mission drift; institutional environment; organizational
structure; target market.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Background
Over the last forty years, microfinance has evolved from the provision of small,
agricultural loans disseminated to impoverished farmers in rural areas to include services
in urban centers administered to a wide range of households. These institutions now offer
services beyond microcredit and operate within diverse organizational structures and
institutional environments. Scholars debate the impact of this organizational
metamorphosis in terms of the outcomes of the institution and the sustainability of this
form of development aid. It seems that microfinance institutions intend to fulfill mission
directed outcomes but are coming under pressure to become sustainable financial
institutions. The mission of the organization, in theory, determines the target market
served and guides the provision of services, in terms of outputs, to specific types of
clients. In this piece, this distinction will be framed in terms of a welfarist versus
institutionalist philosophy of lending, each with a focus on a particular clientele, desired
outcome, and attained by particular administration of services.
1.2 Research Question and Theoretical Constructs
In this study, the link between the mission of an organization will be explored,
framed within the organizational construct of the institution, defined by its charter or
legal type, and from the outputs of the organization. Using the average loan balance of
the organization over time as the main dependent variable, the subsequent regression
analyses will examine the relationship between this variable and explanatory variables
which best indicate the overall health of microfinance institutions, including the scope of
the organization, the demographic served, and the age of the organization. The main
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research question for the analysis is as follows: given that a positive, overall shift in
average loan balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, how does this impact
microfinance institutions and the demographics they target on the intensive and extensive
margins? In theory, MFIs with larger average loan balances are also serving households
closer to the subsistence poverty level (considered the entrepreneurial poor), as opposed
to those living on less than two dollars per day (considered the core poor). This shift to
lending to the entrepreneurial poor from what some scholars argue is the original intent of
microfinance, which in summary is to offer small loans to extremely impoverished
households, is ultimately impacting the target demographics served and the outputs of
these institutions. Newer MFIs are now entering the market implementing a mission that
makes financial sustainability a main output of the organization, while targeting
households who have entrepreneurial potential and the minimal amount of collateral
required to receive a loan from these MFIs.
Through this analysis I hope to show that a shift in outcome is occurring within
individual MFIs and also across microfinance as an industry, as can be measured in the
sample. This shift, from serving the “poorest of the poor” to those living just below the
poverty line in terms of target demographic, is occurring across time in existing,
individual MFIs, but also is impacting newer MFIs entering the market; this will be
measured by the shift in average loan balance across the panel. In this sample, as MFIs
increase in years of operation, the amount they are lending to borrowers also increases,
all else equal. Secondarily, those MFIs considered new and young are lending greater
amounts to fewer borrowers.
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1.3 Organization of Study
The relationship between the legal type and its associated mission, in conjunction
with the average loan balance of the institution as a proxy for the outputs of the
organization, will be explored further in the subsequent chapters. First, a review of
literature will be presented, which encompasses the rationale for microfinance, the
metamorphosis of microfinance as an industry, the impact that the mission of these
organizations has on the outcome, and the influence of the institutional environment. In
addition, the review of literature discusses theoretical considerations surrounding
microfinance institutions, in terms of the target markets of MFIs, how profit influences
the mission of these organizations, factors influencing interest rates and the risk
associated with borrowers, and the manner in which the institutional environment of an
organization impacts the mission and outcomes of the institution. These relationships will
be tested in the empirical section, which includes four empirical models that regress
different iterations of average loan balance against factors that assist in gauging the
overall health of the organization and the fulfillment of their intended mission. The final
section will discuss the implications of these models and areas of future research.

Copyright (c) Bethany Leigh Paris 2013
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature
2.1 Introduction
The following chapter discusses a wide range of topics surrounding microfinance
organizations and the literature surrounding these subjects. First, a brief discussion of the
rationale for microfinance and history of this development strategy will be reviewed. This
will be followed by a discussion of the links between microfinance utilizing this service
as a tool of economic development, in relation to the evolutionary path these
organizations theoretically take in the present literature. The evolution of microfinance
and the arising schism lays the groundwork for the discussion surrounding the mission of
these organizations and the manner in which the mission of microfinance is changing on
the internal and external margins. This discussion will be presented within the framework
of the populations these institutions serve and the intended outcome of the services they
provide to their clients. Finally, the literature examining the role that the organizational
environment can play in the impact and outcomes of microfinance institutions will be
reviewed in order to provide context for the greater institutional framework in which
these institutions operate.
2.2 Rationale for Microfinance
The basic rationale for offering microbanking services to the poor arises from a
large body of work in multiple fields including finance, international development policy,
sociology, agricultural economics, and anthropology. As a basic definition, microfinance
offers a means for poor households to access financial services, such as short-term loans,
that can be used to build a microenterprise, provide secure savings options, crop
insurance, health savings accounts, etc. (Morduch, 1998, 1999, 2000; Littlefield,
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Morduch and Hashemi, 2003; Dale, 2004; Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and Rutheven,
2009; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). Specifically, access to credit benefits recipient
households when the loan itself provides a net surplus once all costs incurred, both
financial and social, are deducted from the provision of the loan; microloans provided by
lending institutions offer a means for poor households to access small amounts of capital
that can be used for a variety of purposes (Zeller, 2001; IFAD, 2003). In addition to this,
access to capital can decrease a household’s vulnerability to external shocks as it is
assumed that the loan recipient(s) will invest the capital in a profit generating venture,
such as a small business or microenterprise.
Initially, semi-formal microcredit services were offered primarily in rural areas by
agricultural development banks and Rotating Credit and Savings Associations (RoSCAs).
These services included the provision of small loans at shorter terms, to which were
attached higher, risk adjusted interest rates than traditional financing in the formal
market. Microfinance as an industry now includes a large urban component that offers a
variety of microbanking services that provide financial access to a broad range of
households living below the poverty line (McGuire and Conroy, 1997; Besley, 1994). In
both urban and rural markets, these institutions target specific populations, predominantly
the poor, women, and the uneducated (Paxton and Cuevas, 2002). These demographics,
in general, lack the required collateral to receive loans in the formal banking sector and
are comprised of extremely poor households that carry elevated levels of risk; since these
households do hold a small capital endowment that could serve as collateral, they rarely
qualify for a loan in the formal sector.

5

Arguments for why the poor need access to capital are similar to those applied to
households that have increased levels of financial stability: on the whole, households
require “…mechanisms to manage cash flows, devices for accumulating assets in both
the short and long-term, and tools for coping with risk” (Karlan and Morduch, 2009, p.
3). Many use informal loans in order to mitigate budget shortfalls; this may entail a loan
from a family member, pooling of resources with neighbors, or taking out a loan from a
moneylender. The issue with the latter option is that these loans may also involve
exorbitant interest rates exceeding 200% in some cases, which may decrease the
household’s future borrowing ability from that specific lender if they default on such a
loan (Rosenberg, Gonzalez, and Narain, 2009).
In addition to credit, access to reliable savings mechanisms have become a vital
component of the provision of financial tools to poor households and empirical evidence
shows that impoverished households with access to savings opportunities have improved
overall levels of health, education, and physical assets, especially in agrarian economies
(Matin, Hulme, and Rutherford, 2002; Awung, 2008; Zeller and Sharma, 2002a). This
type of semi-formal capital management also reduces the volume of high-cost, informal
credit held by households provided by moneylenders. Informal loans from moneylenders,
whose interest can range between 110-200% of the loan principal, can reduce the volume
of productive assets such as land or livestock held by poor households (McIntosh and
Wydick, 2005). Many times, these assets must be sold to repay the loan principal and
interest costs accrued to the money lender, thus reducing the overall capital endowment
and long-term value of the household (Zeller and Meyer, 2002). Informal loans, in this
case, create a destabilizing force to the loan-receiving household. Semi-formal access to
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credit in the form of micro-loans can provide capital to households in such a way as to
not jeopardize savings previously accrued or other productive assets (Zeller and Meyer,
2002; Ling, Zhongyi and von Braun, 2002).
Despite the risk associated with lending to these populations, Microfinance
Institutions (MFIs) offer financial access to individuals and households living below the
poverty line by providing services such as credit, savings, and insurance opportunities
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2008). Once established in an area, MFIs can
form a semi-formal financial environment in which impoverished households can obtain
capital when needed. This access positively reinforces the demand for liquid capital
among the poor; as this demand increases, the volume of long-term assets held by the
individual households decreases. In other words, the value of capital to a household
increases over time as the overall capital endowment of that household decreases; this
demonstrates that poor households value capital at a greater rate than those that have built
up a capital endowment (Zeller and Meyer, 2002).
Within this context, a demand for capital from impoverished households exists
and services offered by MFIs afford poor households access to capital and a means of
short-term financial management used to mediate budget shocks, including medicines to
treat unexpected illness, life cycle events (e.g. weddings, funerals, etc.), and expenses
associated with education (Armedáriz and Morduch, 2004; Wright, 2000). Dale (2001)
frames this range of services demanded by the clients of these institutions in terms of the
“potential pursuits” of MFIs, which include financial intermediation, social mobilization,
organization building, and enterprise development services (p. 609).
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Microfinance can be seen as a development tool for the “productive poor” who
lack access to formal markets, but are presently engaged in small- or micro-scale
business, especially in developing countries (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Such
households can use the money loaned to mitigate the impact of risks or expand a small
business (Zeller and Sharma, 2002b). In addition, as microfinance grows as a sector,
households utilizing these institutions have increasingly demanded savings services over
lines of credit (Rahman, 1999; Rutherford, 1999; Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and
Ruthven, 2009). With the added savings component, clients continue to utilize the range
of services provided by the microfinance institution, which includes increased levels of
savings and capital borrowed per client (Brindisi, 2013).
2.3 Fostering Microfinance as a Development Tool
Assisting impoverished households through banking services is not a new
phenomenon in the developing world. Many countries provided agricultural subsidies or
small business loans to rural farmers as a part of the rural banking movement of the
1950s (Matin, et al., 2002; Gonzalez-Vega, 2003; Guitiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, and
Mar Molinero, 2007; Heidhues, Belle-Sossoh, and Buchenrieder, 2002; Weber, 2004;
von Pischke, 2007; Zeller, 2003; Ellis and Biggs, 2001). The agro-banking model relied
primarily on agricultural loans targeted to rural farmers in order purchase goods that
would increase overall productivity, such as fertilizer, drought resistant seeds, etc. This
movement was downsized in what Wenner (2002) calls the “counterproductivity” of
liberalization within financial markets of developing countries, as many commercial
banks who previously offered rural agricultural loans ceased this practice due to the
restrictions created by the new relaxed, regulatory framework. Liberalization policies
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introduced the necessary regulations for the financial markets of developing countries to
enter into international exchange while simultaneously reducing the breadth of services
offered by commercial banks to the “risk-less” populace, thus excluding a vast portion of
potential loan recipients due to the perceived risk held by these marginally and extremely
poor households (Sérven, 2002). It has been argued that these policies allowed
developing nations to compete in the larger global economy but simultaneously reduced
domestic investment.
In addition, many of the agro-banking programs also failed due to institutional
and programmatic issues, such as restricted levels of outreach in communities, low
repayment rates, institutional inefficiencies which lead to operating losses, and reliance
on government subsidies to cover operating shortfalls (Morduch, 1999; Heidhues, et al.,
2002). The vacuum left by the collapse of the agro-banking sector created a unique
environment in much of the Global South, which the microfinance industry has begun to
fill. Most attribute the creation of microfinance and the idea of microcredit to Muhammed
Yunus and associate the creation of the Grameen banking model implemented in rural
Bangladesh as the new mainstay in the provision of capital to underserved, rural
households. However, this development tool has been utilized in both the formal and
informal settings for thousands of years (e.g. cooperative banking in rural China, credit
unions in the Germanic states, etc.) (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004).
The basic idea of “modern” microfinance is not new but builds on the foundation
set by the agro-banking sector. The newly adopted model adds to the basic assumptions
used in previous iterations of collective cooperative finance and presupposes that there is
a demand among potential clients for particular banking services and that these clients
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also have a willingness to repay the loans, while establishing a credit-based relationship
with the microfinance institution. This reframing of microbanking in the modern context
targeted impoverished households, specifically women, provided group based lending
based upon the assumptions of joint liability and peer pressure to insure repayment of
loans, and compulsory savings component for all members (Quinones and Seibel, 2000).
In fact, some authors argue that the poor consider access to savings as an essential
monetary tool over credit and will borrow money in order to have capital to save over
time as a means of cash flow management (McGuire and Conroy, 1997; Rutherford,
1999; Vonderlack and Schreiner, 2002; Collins, et al., 2009). Savings provided by
microfinance institutions in this structure allows for the households to manage risk and
smooth consumption.
Microfinance has been classified either as a successful or as an ineffective
development tool by a variety of practitioners, clients, and analysts. The range of services
offered, including credit, savings, and insurance options, varies and specific narratives
regarding the successes and the failures of microfinance programs across the globe
provide insight into the effectiveness of these organizations in assisting impoverished
households (Matin, et al., 2002). Several case studies of specific MFIs or MFIs within a
region or country have been assembled and add to the basic understanding and rationale
for these organizations in assisting impoverished households.
Buckley (1997) describes how women entrepreneurs in three African nations
(Kenya, Malawi and Ghana) do not utilize microfinance loans to establish a new business
but use the funds offered by outside lines of credit in order to increase or subsidize
present operations. In this instance, new businesses are primarily created from the
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entrepreneur’s own savings and not from a microloan. The author postulates why he
believes microcredit does not often yield the expected results in the countries he observes
over time; this includes the role that enterprise plays within subcultures, the stability of
the institutional environment and the impact of weak property rights, and how the family
networks influences the overall use of the loan. In this narrative, the author frames
microfinance as a tool increasingly utilized by established business persons, which does
not fall in line with one of the basic assumptions of microfinance that includes starting up
new businesses in communities.
Among the regions where microfinance institutions have been well established,
those MFIs located in South America have seen a shift in terms of the tools used to
provide services and the organizational structure of these institutions. Navajas, Conning,
and Gonzalez-Vega (2003) compare the lending technologies and outcomes of two large
MFIs in Bolivia that began as not-for-profit organizations but have changed their
organizational charter to become “profitable regulated financial intermediaries” (p. 748).
The authors find that the type of loan contract offered to households, whether this is a
personalized loan contract or standardized loan contract, seems to serve as a screening
mechanism for services. BancoSol targets lower end households utilizing a group lending
methodology and standardized loan contracts; in contrast, Caja Los Andes screens each
individual borrower and uses the information obtained to customize the loan contract
according to what the screener assumes the potential loan recipient can repay.
Each MFI serves a specific target population; in Bolivia, BancoSol serves lower
end borrowers while Caja Los Andes targets high-productivity borrowers. In this
particular study, the authors identify specific households moving from one institution to
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another based upon the assumed level of production of these households; specifically, a
borrower at BancoSol that increases its level of productivity will move to Caja Los Andes
as the provision of services of the latter is greater than that of the former. This case study
is significant in the present argument and research as it validates the assumption that
MFIs will tailor the services they offer to the demographic they chose to serve, which
will be discussed further in subsequent sections.
Customizing the services offered to particular households, as was done in Bolivia,
has become a generally accepted practice in providing microloans to impoverished
households. Brau, Hiatt, and Woodworth (2009) observe that Guatemalan MFIs, which
are predominantly not-for-profit, target low end households in order to assist them in
establishing a profit generating business, so that these households can then be eligible for
loans in the formal banking sector. Kaboski and Townsend (2005) observe that MFIs in
rural and semi-urban Thailand offer a wide range of services and have seen success in a
particular subset of services. Those MFIs that offer “training services, savings services,
and pledged savings accounts...were each individually associated with faster asset growth
rates” (p. 3); conversely, those that link services to agricultural outcomes did not see long
term success or organizational sustainability. In addition, these particular households,
which were mostly in village banks, seemed to demand “flexible accounts” that can be
used to reduce the impact of income shocks such as family emergencies. Again, this
study highlights that MFIs are not homogenous and offer a wide range of services to the
clients they assist.
In addition to the type of target market and the customization of these services,
serving the poor in a particular environment influences the outcomes and sustainability of
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microfinance organizations. Navajas and Gonzalez-Vega (2000) observe that the majority
of MFIs in Latin America serve an urban population, as opposed to the largely rural
composition of Asian MFIs. Specifically, in El Salvador lending technologies have been
customized in order to reach the designated target market of the MFI in the particular
environment which they are operating. The authors frame this as “...systematically
adapting non-traditional lending technologies...” that “...have created comparative
advantages in reaching particular market niches and have matched different lending
procedures with different types of potential clients” (p. 3). This difference was observed
within one MFI, Financiera Calpiá, which serves both urban and rural households; urban
borrowers are mostly microentrepreneurs while rural borrowers are farmers, traders or
microentrepreneurs. Therefore, this particular institution must customize services, from
the type of banking tools used to maintain operations to the strategies utilized by loan
officers to the lending technologies offered to their clients. Again, it can be observed in
this case study that within one MFI, these institutions must customize their services to the
demographic they serve in order to meet the demand of their customers and maintain
long-term operations
The latest philosophy of banking to the poor takes into account the complexities
introduced by information asymmetries and moral hazard between the loan recipient and
the lender, which impact the demand and supply of capital because of the risks and high
transaction costs associated with lending to the poor which were observed in the
preceding case studies of microfinance institutions (Zeller and Johannsen, 2006).
Compared to commercial banks, the microfinance sector is less regulated, has higher loan
repayment rates among loan recipients than the formal market, and continues to grow as
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an emergent, semi-formal financial sector. In addition, as the sector grows and MFIs can
better assess the demands of their client base, many MFIs are introducing a savings
component into their services, which has become very popular. Rutherford (1999)
proposes that microfinance institutions should provide a wide range of services to
impoverished households, but more importantly provide and emphasize savings as a vital
component in assisting these households in managing their wealth. Despite this
movement towards providing a broader range of banking services, most MFIs’ product
range is much less diverse than commercial banks (especially MFIs that are not-forprofit) and, overall, lack liquidity in terms of mobilizing equity, as savings is not a
service offered by the majority of MFIs (O’Brien, 2006).
The challenge for policy makers, creditors, and donors in supporting programs
such as microfinance is ensuring that this development tool is used as a poverty reduction
program in order to target aid toward the intended demographic and desired outcomes,
which in the case of microfinance involves increasing a household’s earning potential
through access to business start-up capital or subsidizing budget shortfalls via microloans
(Hulme and Mosley, 1997; Sharma and Buchenreider, 2002; Wright, 2000). The longterm impact of microfinance hinges on the overall sustainability of the lending program
and institution, and, in turn, the ability of the households to utilize the capital lent in
creating lasting and sustainable sources of income. Effectively including the poor in
financial markets benefits the entire economic system of a developing nation by
increasing these households’ ability to manage shocks and crises, which most
governments in this classification cannot provide due to a general scarcity of public funds
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that could be allocated to social welfare programs (Zeller, 2001; IFAD, 2003; Christen,
Lauer, Lyman and Rosenberg, 2011).
Government involvement in financial development programs can assist in
creating an institutional environment that promotes overall economic stability. This may
increase the flow of capital to the poorest households with, for example, policies that
clarify the property rights of individuals which can be used as loan collateral (Churchill,
1997; Lepanu, 2002; Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Park, 1993). The challenge remains
for governments to maintain a balance in the policy environment which aids in
macroeconomic stability while promoting an environment where informal businesses,
such as microenterprises, can positively contribute to overall economic growth (Yaron
and Benjamin, 2002). Microloans, supplied by informal or semi-formal institutions such
as MFIs, fill a gap in the provision of capital to poor households that the formal market
cannot support, given it is assumed that these loan recipients will have an increased rate
of default and carry excessive risk (Matin, Hulme, and Rutherford, 2002). As such, in
some environments, government support of MFIs through liberalization policies would
generate a positive social return in the long run for the poorest households (Yaron, 1992;
Zeller, et al., 1997; Zeller, 2003). This will be discussed further in Section 2.7.
2.4 Evolution and Schism of Microfinance
Although not as diverse in terms of services offered to clients when compared to
banks in the formal financial sector, a pattern has emerged in the development of MFIs as
semi-formal lending institutions. Microfinance institutions seem to develop in two
distinct phases. In the first phase, small loans are disseminated to potential entrepreneurs
in a community, where the main target of the program is increasing the volume of loans
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disseminated in the community to impoverished households and the institution
concentrates on growth as the main outcome. Loans become a vehicle for economic
development within the community, promoting long-term improvement in household
quality of life and production capacity. The second phase involves increasing the volume
of loans as an expansion of services where the MFI distinguishes between two groups,
those who utilize the services offered for consumption smoothing purposes and those
who invest the capital lent into a small business venture, where it is assumed that the
small business will become a semi-permanent, profit-generating venture for the
household. In this framework, financial sustainability becomes a focus of the MFI while
creating a programmatic shift towards community development, in terms of improving
the overall quality of life of the loan recipients (at this point not taking into account
spillover effects) (Seibel, 1985).
This evolutionary process directly reflects the mission chosen by the institution
and the type of lending model used, where the lending model is associated with the
baseline household income level of those served by the institution (i.e. institutions with
an individual lending model tend to serve subsistence poor households over core poor
households) (Arch, 2005; Farrington and Abrams, 2002). Types of MFIs include
development banks, private foundations, multilateral banks, and commercial banks with
microcredit subsidiaries.
MFIs can either concentrate on financial sustainability by creating financial
breadth or poverty reduction which involves increased outreach and reliance on financial
subsidies to maintain operations; each involves a distinct set of lending practices and
goals determined by the MFI’s mission statement and established by its governing board
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members or shareholders (Ledgerwood, 1999; Mosley and Hulme, 1998; Schreiner,
2002; Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters, 2011). Outreach can be formally defined as
“worth minus cost, weighted by depth, summed across breadth of users and scope of
contracts, and discounted through length of time” (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, GonzalezVega and Rodriguez-Meza, 2002, p. 156). Sustainability in this context relies almost
exclusively upon the length and type of service provided to households by the institution
(Lepanu, 2002).
Bogan (2009) suggests that all MFIs proceed through a life-cycle in terms of
creating a viable and sustainable financial institution, from developing subsidized
operations at the beginning of the life-cycle to establishing a reliable client base which
meets the capital requirements for covering the operating expenses of the institution.
McGuire and Conroy (1997) distinguish between the goals of the institution in terms of
the financial innovation used, whether that is through the financial institution itself, the
system supporting the organization, the process via the financial tools provided to clients,
or the services provided to clients.
Throughout the life-cycle, microfinance institutions, in theory, target specific
households or a sub-set of the poor in order to fulfill a specific outcome. This is reflected
in the mission of the organization and the means by which the MFI carries out the goals
of the institution, which is also linked to the mission. MFIs have three modes of operation
in this framework, which are reinforced by the mission of the organization: survival,
sustainability, or self-sufficiency (Pollinger, Outhwaite, and Cordero-Guzmán, 2007).
Survival emphasizes dissemination and repayment of loans at a flat interest rate for all
borrowers in order to meet monthly expenses; other financial services such as savings are
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not offered during this stage. In the second mode of operation, institutions concentrate on
sustainability and have the ability to raise capital in order to maintain a specific level of
outreach by procuring grants that subsidize operations, temporary business loans from the
formal market or international organizations, or increasing the program participant base.
Finally, those MFIs who have incorporated a self-sufficiency clause in their mission rely
solely on income generated by interest on the loans disseminated, where the APR is set to
the most efficient rate to maintain an appropriate level of clients, who hold as much risk
as the institution itself is willing to absorb, while maintaining a necessary capital base for
lending to present and future clients (Caudill, Gropper and Hartarska, 2009). These
methods of operation can be, but are not entirely, mutually exclusive in terms of linking
organizational outcomes to the mission of the organization and many MFIs use a
combination of techniques in order to maintain present and future levels of institutional
operation.
In terms of linking the mission of the organization to the operational state of the
lending entity, many organizations establish a formal mission statement which reflects
both the target market and intended outcome of the institution. Mission statements of
MFIs can define the overall goal of the entity and classify the framework of their
outreach, where the goal may be to reduce poverty, to become a self-sustaining lending
entity or a combination thereof (Hishigsuren, 2007; Kirkpatrick and Maimbo, 2002;
Mersland and Strøm, 2010). This overarching goal also encompasses the intended social
benefits of the organization to its clients, which is linked directly to the targeted outreach
methodology of the MFI. This incorporates the clients’ willingness to repay the loans, the
overall sum of costs (price and transaction) to the clients, the level of poverty of the
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clients (marginal versus chronic poverty levels), the total number of clients the MFI can
potentially support, the duration of supply, and scope of services the MFI can offer given
their equity base (e.g. loans, savings, insurance, etc.) (Schreiner, 2002, p. 2).
Those MFIs who choose poverty alleviation (outreach) as their primary goal
assume that serving a large number of clients will make up for the lack of financial
reserves that would be generated in focusing on creating a self-sustaining lending model.
Conversely, those MFIs who concentrate on financial breadth seek to build a selfsustaining network of borrowers by creating viable financial instruments rather than
focusing solely on decreasing the overall poverty level of the clients served, regardless of
the loss to the institution. An institution is considered self-sustaining when it is able “to
cover at least 99.5% of expenses exclusive of subsidies or grants…generating sufficient
profit to cover expenses while eliminating all subsidies, even those less-obvious
subsidies, such as loans made in hard currency with repayment in local currency” (Tucker
and Miles, 2004, p. 42).
While both types of MFIs strive to reduce the level of poverty in the demographic
they choose to serve, those concentrating on financial breadth add a level of complexity
to their mission by necessitating that the fulfillment of this mission include lending and
savings instruments that the organization can maintain over time. Dale (2001) frames this
difference in terms of the focus and scope of the organization in which the minimalist
organization concentrates on financial sustainability, while the integrated organization
includes a broader range of services that may include literacy training, training in
nutrition, etc.
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With the distinction between two broad classifications of intended outcomes
through the mission, this statement directly impacts the institutional performance and
outcomes of MFIs by distinguishing the goals of and population served by the lending
entity. Mission statements serve as a means by which the organization clearly defines
expectations for employees, overall goals, and intended outreach priorities (Weis and
Piderit, 1999). Mission also impacts the composition of borrowers an organization serves,
where an organization seeking to reach the poorest borrowers will absorb greater levels
of risk as they intentionally include and target a higher percentage “non-bankable”
borrowers (Pollinger, et al., 2007). This serves as the basic framework for the operations
of the organization.
The mission of these organizations impacts not only the target demographic of the
organization but can also influence the methods of lending or product offered by a
particular entity. Guitiérrez-Nieto, et al., (2007) frame the mission of microfinance
institutions as adhering to a model of intermediation or production; MFIs either
emphasize collecting deposits in order to create capital to be redistributed or emphasize
the production of outputs through the generation of physical assets, respectively.
However, despite a clearly defined mission and the intended outcomes, it seems that the
missions of outreach based MFIs can drift toward financial sustainability (Ling, et al.,
2002). It is important to take into account that MFIs meet operating costs via interest
incomes generated by loans, which amounts to “...the rate charged to borrowers less the
MFI cost of funding—and associated fees, including both one-time fees and those levied
at regular intervals through the loan term” (Pollinger, et al., 2007, p. 29). MFIs must
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balance their mission directed purpose to fall within each individual organization’s
budget constraint.
As these organizations evolve and become a semi-permanent part of local
economies, MFIs can utilize the information they obtain and record regarding clients and
offer services to particular groups of poor households, tailored to the amount of risk the
organization is willing to take on and perceives that these particular households hold.
These organizations remain risk averse in their basic relationship to clients and the
services they provide reflect this, as they do not operate within the same environment as
formal banking institutions; a quarter or year of high default rates and the MFI may be
forced to close its doors.
Bogan (2009) frames the evolutionary change within MFIs as the life-cycle theory
of microfinance, linking the chosen target demographic to the services offered within the
organization’s ability to sustain itself, with or without outside capital assistance. This
theory creates a link between the stage of development of the MFI in terms of its capital
structure, operational sustainability, efficiency in generating its product, and overall
outreach to its target demographic (Helms, 2006; Fehr and Hishigsuren, 2004; Farrington
and Abrams, 2002; Meyer and Zeller, 2002; Sharma and Buchenrieder, 2002).
Sustainability in this framework can be measured in terms of the operational and
financial aspects of the organization, where the former is purely linked to the balance
sheet (i.e. are the revenues generated covering the costs of producing the number of loans
demanded) and the latter takes into account the amount of subsidization the organization
requires to maintain itself.
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As the use of loans and the demand for banking services by poor households has
changed, so must the lenders’ ideology of providing capital to the households accessing
funds in the form of services demanded, creating a secondary shift in the motivation
behind microbanking aside from the designation of a target demographic of the
organization. Clients are now demanding services such as savings, health insurance
accounts, tuition escrow accounts, crop insurance, etc., and can utilize these services
from MFIs as they are not available from the formal banking market for the standard
reasons of risk associated with this subset of clients. If subsidies allow for the expansion
of services to include more of what clients demand and retain them as long run clients,
this could ensure the long-term sustainability of the organization, while meeting the
fundamental principles of both the welfarist and institutionalist philosophies of
microbanking. Regardless of this interaction, the demand for services from each distinct
target market is becoming an important component of organizational output for
microfinance institutions.
Microfinance as an industry has not evolved to a pluralistic perspective that blurs
the lines of the “schism” and most practitioners still hold to either the welfarist or
institutionalist framework of microlending. In practice, the schism is manifested through
the charter or legal type which the MFI self-selects and thereby determines its basic
lending structure and, in turn, the clients it chooses to predominantly serve. The category
that the mission of the organization falls within is directly linked to the charter type of the
organization. For the sake of the theoretical considerations in this piece, legal or charter
type will be the proxy for the assumptions surrounding the institutional type discussed
above. The charter type and the subsequent mission reflect the basic beliefs of the
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organization, defining the lending model the institution aligns itself with in terms of
managing short-run and long-run operations, along with the demographic of the targeted
loan recipients. MFIs classified as banks, in this framework, embody the institutionalist
approach to lending, as they emphasize operational sustainability through loans and
savings opportunities. Conversely, non-government organizations (NGOs) choose to
target the poorest households in a community, making smaller loans to a greater number
of clients while potentially relying on subsidies such as grants to maintain operations,
which closely resembles the welfarist perspective.
The basic differences between the welfarist and institutionalist ideologies are
shown below in Figure 2.4.1. The conceptual differences of these types of organizations
(welfarist versus institutionalist) are the poverty lending approach versus financial
systems approach, respectively (Robinson, 2001; Moll, 2005). These concepts are then
measured using the charter or legal type of the organization, average loan balance, and
the correlating target market. Figure 2.4.1 maps both these measurable variables to the
broader concepts. The boundary of $1,000 in average loan balance is ultimately arbitrary
but is based upon benchmarks set in previous research (Bogan, 2009; Cull, DemirgüçKunt, and Morduch, 2008; Hartarska and Mersland, 2012; Hermes, Lensink and
Meesters, 2011; Hishigsuren, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Vogelgesang; 2003).
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Figure 2.4.1: Welfarist versus Institutionalist Microfinance Institutions

Institutionalist

Welfarist

• Financial Systems
Approach
• Profit Generating
• Average Loan
Balance ≥ $1,000
• Entrepreneurial
Poor

• Poverty Lending
Approach
• Not-for-profit
• Average Loan
Balance < $1,000
• Core Poor

This diagram illustrates the basic generalizations regarding the services provided
by both types of MFIs as discussed throughout this chapter, as these institutions offer
different services across the spectrum of potential clients in many different combinations.
Welfarist organizations primarily target core poor households and are not-for-profit
organizations lending smaller average loan balances. Institutionalist organizations seek to
maximize their profits in order to maintain services to their clients; because of this they
target the entrepreneurial poor who they consider to hold less risk than the core poor and
lend larger amounts to these households as a result.
Morduch (2000) labels this as the “schism between rhetoric and action,” where
the institution may in theory, as outlined in their mission, seek to alleviate poverty but is
faced with the difficulty of maintaining a financially sustainable organization that can
serve the target demographic over multiple periods. From this schism, financially-minded
and socially-minded practitioners clash in terms of the use and impact of microlending as
a poverty alleviation tool, as the former directs services with the sole purpose of
maintaining operations and the latter seeks to assist a greater volume of impoverished
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households (p. 618). A shift in the mission of microcredit supplying organizations can
arise due to the tension created by two juxtaposed ideologies of microfinance, which
includes the pressure to create a financially sustainable organization against the mission
of providing capital transfer services to poor households in the form of lines of credit,
savings accounts, crop insurance, etc. Many MFIs add a sustainability clause to their
mission statement as a way to formally establish their intent to form a sustainable
organization which may be attributed to pressure from board members, funding agencies,
government regulators, etc., concerned with the long-term community impact and
financial viability of the organization. This is the schism of microfinance; the issue that
arises due to the shift from a welfarist to an institutionalist mindset includes a
fundamental tenant of microfinance surrounding interest rates, assumed risk, and capital
returns to the MFI and is reflected in the mission of the organization (Morduch 1999,
2000; Dale, 2001; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004;).
In line with the theory surrounding the schism of microfinance, interest rates are
theoretically kept below the regulated, formal market interest rate in order to provide
capital to the collateral-less, poor households wishing to use credit in order to build a
business or smooth consumption. MFIs attempt to select loan recipients who will create a
local small business, which will positively support a sustainable development model in
the community in which it exists, under the assumption that the local economy can
absorb these microenterprises in order reap the economies of scale created by these small
businesses (Bateman, 2010). Therefore, MFIs must set a generalized interest rate which
does not crowd out a particular subset of poorer households but that simultaneously
generates sufficient interest income for the MFI to maintain operations. If the rate is too
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high, the poorest households will be crowded out due to the expense of the loan; if it is
too low, the MFI may be absorbing too much risk in terms of their loan portfolio and, in
turn, decreases the long-term sustainability of the organization. Generating a sustainable
organization can lead to increased economic security for borrowers, reduced reliance on
moneylenders and other volatile sources of informal credit, increased security in social
networks (especially in those MFIs adhering to a group lending model), and increased
production potential for individuals and households (Dale, 2001).
Each side of the debate has a distinct critique of the opposing ideology. From a
welfarist perspective, institutionalist organizations focus too heavily on financial
sustainability as the main outcome of the organization, as previously discussed, and
accomplish this goal by profit maximization via interest rates set to levels very similar to
those in the formal market. These interest rates allow the MFI to reduce or eliminate
reliance on external subsidies to cover operating expenses. The core poor households,
who according to the original purpose of microfinance are the target demographic, are
driven out of the MFI market due to the commercialization of MFIs and the shift in staff
members’ focus to disseminating loans to sustain operations, meet quarterly lending
quotas, etc.
Conversely, institutionalist organization ideology takes issue with the welfarist
entities’ focus on population as opposed to a sustainable outcome. Per the institutionalist
perspective, welfarist organizations’ concentrate on maximizing short-run profits instead
of focusing on the long-term benefits of supporting sustainable business ventures in the
community. By concentrating on the short-run gains to cover long-term costs, welfarist
institutions must rely on subsidies to cover operational shortfalls and sustain future
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lending cycles. These subsidies, provided many times by external funding agencies such
as development aid groups, assist welfarist organizations in maintaining operations but
create a vacuum of sorts where the organization is neither operationally self-sufficient nor
sustainable, major tenants of the institutionalist philosophy.
However, this schism between the welfarist and institutionalist ideologies may not
be a rift between two opposing viewpoints but simply the manifestation of evolution
within the microfinance industry, a natural course in terms of development in these
organizations. MFIs can potentially assist a spectrum of poor households, ranging from
the core poor to the entrepreneurial poor to the lower middle class by offering a variety of
services, from a formal banking model to a group based cooperative approach to a notfor-profit lending model, etc. This speaks to the metamorphosis of microfinance as a
semi-formal banking industry, where it is no longer solely used as a source of capital for
small businesses owned by impoverished households.
The institution concentrating on creating sustainable operations without external
subsidization assesses its client base and the available equity, assigning the appropriate
interest rate to absorb the risk associated with lending to particular populations. This may
lead to the institution lending larger amounts to fewer clients, which will be discussed
further in the next chapter. Outreach based or welfarist MFIs tend to lend smaller
amounts at a greater rate, which leads to higher transaction costs. This increases the costs
of operation for the institution in terms of the administration of loans. To reduce this cost,
MFIs adopting this lending methodology rely on subsidies to maintain operations, while
reducing the cost of administering the higher volume of loans (Morduch, 1999).
However, many MFIs are under increased pressure from board members and donors to be
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self-sustaining, which falls in line with the sustainable development movement; this
pressure can force outreach based MFIs to lend slightly larger amounts to less poor
(potentially entrepreneurial) households in order to reduce administrative costs and
reliance on subsidies to maintain long-term operations. This is the main rift in the
discussion of mission drift within MFIs.
This rift or schism in rhetoric and action, as discussed above, creates an
environment where MFIs must heavily depend upon subsidization by donors and/or aid
agencies to meet budget shortfalls, given that they choose to target poorer households and
the smaller loans that these clients demand. Donor subsidization offers a means for the
MFI to retain present client levels (and perhaps even increase client levels), while
preserving the intended social benefits of the MFI and some semblance of institutional
efficiency (Morduch, 1999).
Efficiency in this context is linked to the environment in which the institution
operates, the profit status of the entity (e.g. non-government organization), how credit
officers implement the mission of the organization in terms of inputs, and the gross loan
portfolio of the institution (Guitiérrez-Nieto, et al., 2007). The composition of the
governing board directly influences the efficiency of the microfinance institution. As the
number of creditors on a board of governors or directors increases, the overall financial
efficiency, in terms of self-sustaining operations, of the organization also increases.
Hartarska and Mersland (2009) argue that a board comprised mostly of donors decreases
the efficiency of the organization, in terms of meeting operating costs and financial
outcomes, because donors are less likely to be concerned with long-run cost minimization
and instead concentrate on increasing services to their target demographic. Again, this
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may decrease organizational efficiency and lead to budget shortfalls that are covered by
grants or other forms of subsidization. Governance of the rules adopted by the board with
clearly outlined goals and outcomes, regardless of the composition of this group of
individuals, can also indicate the level of efficiency at which an institution will operate
given the assumptions discussed above that are reflected in the organization’s mission
(Lepanu, 2002).
Weiss, Montgomery, and Kurmanalieva (2003) specifically outline the links
between subsidizing and the intended outcomes of the organization.
...the issue should be, what benefits in terms of income gains for
the poor can be achieved with the subsidy and how does the ratio
of

subsidy

to

benefits

compare

with

that

for

other

interventions...there is a need to continually improve design and
outreach and to see MFIs as part of the package for targeting the
poor, rather than the whole solution (p. 16-7).
This suggests that short-term subsidies, in order to preserve long term goals, may be
necessary to cover the costs of supplying loans by MFIs, especially in the case of MFIs
whose primary mission is poverty reduction.
However, proponents of financial sustainability claim that subsidies weaken the
financial viability of the lending entity in the long term, if the number of clients served
continues to grow and subsidization remains at the same level. Within this argument, the
interest rate the organization charges, which is contingent on the number of potential
borrowers, is secondarily influenced by the amount the organization is subsidized. This
value-neutral interest rate, as defined by Pollinger, et al., (2007), is determined by
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gauging the demand by borrowers and lenders in the market. Therefore, each MFI must
determine the subsidy required to maintain operations if the established interest rate is not
sufficient enough to cover operating expenses. As boards are pressuring MFIs to reduce
reliance on subsidies, there is movement within the microfinance community to use
lending contracts, with specified terms similar to those in the formal market, in order to
ensure that the MFI can generate profit enough to sustain the institution at an interest rate
acceptable to both the loan recipient and the lender (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004;
Daley-Harris, 2003).
Another means by which microfinance institutions chose to mitigate an excess of
demand for their services is through group lending models or self help groups (SHGs).
This model of microfinance allows multiple borrowers to form one group and pool
resources, while reducing the overhead costs of lending to individuals to the MFI. For
example, five borrowers each contribute twenty dollars to their joint account; one
member of the group is allowed to borrow a certain percentage, or in some cases all of
the balance to use for the month. The borrowed amount is then repaid to the joint account
by the repayment date plus interest; using this framework, the group retains a specific
balance with the MFI and the MFI is generating sufficient interest income to maintain the
service for the borrowers.
Self help groups (SHGs) utilized by ROSCAs reduce information asymmetries
because loan recipients actively seek out potential group members with similar levels of
risk, also known as assortative matching (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004; Stiglitz,
1990). These groups will utilize peer monitoring in order to ensure they will continue to
receive loans as a group in the future (Stiglitz, 1990). Expected costs associated with safe
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groups of borrowers will be lower compared to riskier borrowers. It is assumed safer
groups will also be more active in such an environment as they will have a greater
likelihood to continue to receive credit; riskier borrowing groups, should they default on
a loan, will no longer be eligible to receive capital from that specific lending institution.
Given that potential borrowers have multiple options in terms of lending
institutions within their community, matching can also occur between the type of client
and the type of institution; those clients who have collateral will gravitate toward
individual loans, while those that do not have access to collateral borrow via the group
lending model (Aseefa, Hermes, and Meesters, 2012; Meyer and Zeller, 2002; Peterson
and Rajan, 1995). This also correlates with the type of institution who offers such
services, where institutionalist organizations provide loans to individuals and welfarist
organizations loan to groups at a greater rate. Hermes, et al., (2011) find that group
lending is the model primarily used by rural banks and non-government organizations
(NGOs) and generally costs institutions less in terms of costs per borrower, which can be
attributed to peer monitoring and assortative matching. Across the MFI sector, the
increased entrance of banks and non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs) has led to an
overall increase in the average loan balance distributed.
While some authors consider this sector wide mission drift, the mission of
previously established MFIs is not necessarily changing but the increased presence of
banks within the market, as a whole, is influencing the type of lending methodology
(individual lending contracts versus group lending models). Within this environment,
impoverished households are more likely to receive individual loans and the overall size
of the average loan balance is increasing (Navajas, et al., 2002). It may also represent an
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overall shift in the generally accepted lending philosophy within the microfinance
community, where varying types of lending contracts may offer a more permanent
solution to the schism of microfinance which can mitigate the lending institutions’
challenge of determining the risk of the client and the demand for capital in under-served
populations (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004; Daley-Harris, 2003; Meyer and Zeller,
2002). Poorest clients will gravitate toward group lending models to reduce their own risk
of default, while those households who have minimal amounts of collateral may choose
an institution that mimics a formal bank and disseminates loans to individuals.
2.5 Mission Drift and Microfinance Institutions
As seen in the previous section, the mission of an organization influences the
outcome and tools used to reach this goal. The mission of microfinance institutions falls
within two basic camps, with these organizations either concentrating on outreach to
clients or financial sustainability. Woller, Dunford, and Woodworth (1999) frame this
difference in mission as either the institutionalist (financial sustainability) or the welfarist
(outreach) approach to microfinance. These two lending ideologies of microfinance
institutions can also be framed as a poverty lending approach (welfarist) or financial
systems approach (institutionalist) (Hishigsuren, 2007).
As the basic mission of microfinance was to assist impoverished households
through the dissemination of micro-loans in order to improve the short-term outlook of
these households, a change in the focus of this mission can be observed through the
outcomes of microfinance institutions. Mission drift manifests itself in the model of
lending (e.g. to individuals, group lending, cooperatives, etc.) and the institutional
structure of the lending entity (e.g. bank, credit union, subsidized loans, etc.) (Sadoulet,
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2005; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, 2007). Some authors postulate that existing
MFIs are not changing their missions by drifting toward one extreme or the other but that
each of these approaches, welfarist or institutionalist, defines the community served
differently and creates financial instruments to best serve these populations while
maintaining other institutional goals (Woller, Dunford and Woodworth, 1999). However,
as discussed in this section, it seems that more institutionalist organization are entering
the microfinance market, and thereby influencing the broader mission of these
institutions. In addition, the degree to which the amount lent to clients increases
demonstrates the directional shift of an organization’s mission and corresponding output;
as the average balance of loans disseminated increases across time, the depth of the
organization decreases because it now provides larger loans to fewer clients (Hermes,
Lensink, and Meesters, 2011).
As a result of the schism of microfinance and the mission alignment of these
organizations between two basic ideologies, the services offered and target demographics
of these organizations also vary. Several authors generate hypotheses as to why this
occurs. In terms of the services produced by MFIs and the costs associated with these
products, smaller loans cost the organization more to generate per borrower than larger
loans, in terms of the transaction costs. Many MFIs are adopting policies that would
support an increase in average loan balance so as to decrease the per unit costs associated
with lending, which reinforces the debate surrounding the trade-off between outreach and
sustainability (Moll, 2005; Zeller and Johanssen, 2006; Hishigsuren, 2007; Cull,
Demirgüç-Cunt, and Morduch, 2009; Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2011). If MFIs
adopt such a policy, they would in theory be selecting to disseminate fewer loans to
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extremely impoverished households (the “core poor”) and lend at a greater level to
entrepreneurial poor households. Core households demand smaller loans at shorter terms
than entrepreneurial poor households. As a result, there is a greater likelihood that core
poor households will receive lending services from welfarist institutions, while
entrepreneurial poor receive these same services from institutionalist organizations.
Given that the lender can distinguish between the potential borrowers discussed
above, welfarist organizations (MFIℓ) will lend at a greater rate to core poor households
(ℓ) than institutionalist organizations; conversely, institutionalist organizations (MFIh)
will lend at a greater rate to entrepreneurial poor households (h) than welfarist
organizations, which is a generally accepted statement and validated hypothesis in the
literature surrounding these organizations.
This designation of organizational and borrower type are based upon the
assumptions of the law of diminishing returns as reframed by Armendáriz and Morduch,
(2010). In this framework, the capital to output ratio of the entrepreneurial poor yields a
greater return on investment than that of the core poor due to the relationship between the
initial endowments of each type of household and subsequent earnings potential held by
these households (Lucas, 1990; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Figure 2.5.2, a direct
replication of Figure 1.4 as presented by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, p. 21), presents
a graphical depiction of the difference between the capital to output ratio of the two types
of households as discussed above. In the graph as previously discussed, the return on
investment for the poorer entrepreneur (core poor borrower) is less than that of the richer
entrepreneur (entrepreneurial poor).
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Figure 2.5.2: Marginal Returns to Capital (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010)

Although the risk associated with the core poor household is greater than that of
the entrepreneurial poor household, and in theory should result in greater returns, the
profit generated by the core poor is substantially less than that of the entrepreneurial poor
household. In other words, the lending institution considers the entrepreneurial poor to be
a safer bet, in terms of overall risk and the potential to generate the necessary capital to
repay the money lent, as these lending institutions are risk averse. In terms of linking
mission to the outputs of the MFI, the institutionalist organization will lend at a greater
rate to the entrepreneurial poor due to assumed level of risk and greater likelihood of
return of initial investment. As risk and financial sustainability are not cornerstones of a
welfarist mission, these organizations are more likely to lend to the core poor, as the main
directive of this mission is to assist impoverished households.
The main assumptions of the Law of Diminishing returns and its application to
the theory of MFIs are that households differ in terms of the amount of capital each type
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of poor, classified as either core poor or entrepreneurial poor, may initially hold. In other
words, the endowment of each demographic influences the level of output of each type of
the poor. As it is assumed that the endowment varies between the types of households
discussed, this impacts the household’s ability to use the capital lent by a MFI for a
business venture. It is assumed that the endowment of poor households is substantially
less than that of an entrepreneurial poor household. Therefore, the former will use the
capital lent for consumption smoothing purposes at a greater rate, while the
entrepreneurial poor are more likely to use loan monies in the creation or support of a
business.
The core poor have a smaller marginal return on investment compared to the
entrepreneurial poor, based upon the potential profitability of each type of household, in
conjunction with the assumed risk associated with these households and corresponding
interest rate assigned by the MFI. A household’s output, regardless of their degree of
poverty, depends on its initial capital endowment, as seen in Figure 2.5.2 and discussed in
detail by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010). This can be applied to both populations, as a
main assumption of this adaptation of the Law of Diminishing Returns is that the stocks
of capital held by and the production potential of the latter is greater than that of the
former. In addition, the rate at which these households are able to generate profits in this
relationship may be different across multiple households and the degree to which this
changes is influenced by a variety of factors that are difficult to measure outside of a true
impact analysis of these services (Hulme, 2000).
This theory surrounding the distinction between the two types of poor, the
potential output of these households, and the impact of targeting a specific demographic
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will be controlled for in the empirical analysis. The target demographic or market of the
organization is a direct reflection of the mission of the organization, as discussed at
length in the previous section. These concepts are essential to the subsequent analyses
and are captured by the explanatory variable “Target Market.” This variable is a
categorical variable in which MFIs distinguish the group of individuals on which it
primarily focuses its services; the institutions can designate if they target a broad group of
borrowers, low end borrowers, high end borrowers, or those households seeking to create
a small business. This variable is defined in Appendix C. By using this variable, we are
able to control for the households MFIs define as their primary loan recipients and
determine if this varies across time which may or may not support the hypothesis that
mission drift is occurring in these institutions.
In terms of the target market and profit of microbanking institutions, two broad
groups of MFIs are emerging in the realm of disseminating micro-loans to two groups of
poor households: welfarist institutions (MFIℓ) and institutional organizations (MFIh), as
defined by Woller, Dunford, and Woodworth (2002), and discussed at length in previous
sections in terms of the relationship between organizational mission and institutional
outcomes. In theory, these two classifications of MFI serve specific target markets and
assumed a particular level of risk that is associated with each target market. Specifically,
MFIs serving the core poor (predominantly welfarist) have higher costs of production and
are willing to absorb greater levels of risk than those serving the entrepreneurial poor
(predominantly institutionalist), based upon two assumptions.
First, the MFI serving the core poor takes on more risk compared to the MFI
choosing to target the entrepreneurial poor, as the borrowers themselves hold more risk in
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terms of budget based and environmental volatility. Second, the cost of producing smaller
loans, which are demanded at a greater rate by the core poor as opposed to the
entrepreneurial poor, is greater than that of larger loans in terms of the per unit cost
linked to the administration of these loans (Hishigsuren, 2007; McIntosh and Wydick,
2005; Zeller and Johannsen, 2006).
Given the assumptions above regarding the households each group of MFIs
chooses to serve, the potential profit of MFIs and the overall impact of the organization in
a community are directly impacted by this choice in demographic. Since the costs of
production are higher for the welfarist organization compared to the institutionalist
organization based upon the average loan disseminated and the administrative costs
associated with these loans, the profit of the welfarist institution will be less than that of
the institutionalist organization. This profit is also linked to the optimal interest rate of
the organization and is a reflection of the mission of the organization. Gauging the impact
of the services offered is necessary in assessing the outcomes of the organization, which,
in theory, are directly linked to the mission of the organization and the target market
(Hulme 2000; Weiss and Piderit, 1999).
2.6 Interest Rates and Target Markets
As discussed above, the likelihood of lending to a particular demographic of the
poor depends on the perceived risk of the borrower by the MFI. This risk is mitigated by
the lending institution via the interest rate it assigns to each loan recipient; the riskier
borrower receives a higher interest rate compared to a safer borrower. Given that an
institution’s choice in target demographic impacts the overall profit of the organization as
guided by their established mission, those institutions serving the poor, and especially the
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core poor, are left with the decision of how to mitigate the cost and risk associated with
lending to this population. The institution, being both risk averse and profit maximizing,
will lend the greatest amount of capital at the institution’s optimal interest rate (𝑟̽�)̽ to the
corresponding demographic (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Again, this rate is influenced by
the risk associated with the target borrower demographic and costs of providing such a
service to the particular household or group of households. As seen in Figure 2.6.3,
adapted from Stigliz and Weiss’ (1981) Figure One titled: “There exists an interest rate
which maximizes the expected return to the bank,” welfarist and institutionalist MFIs
have differing interest rates that are determined by the risk they are willing to absorb
while maintaining services to their target demographic. These optimal interest rates
maximize the returns to the organization within the constraints of the MFI’s mission.
Figure 2.6.3: Comparison of Optimal Interest Rate by MFI Type

The optimal interest rate of welfarist institutions (𝑟�ℓ∗ ) presently in the market is

approximately 25% and for institutionalist organizations (𝑟�ℎ∗) it ranges between 13-19%,
39

which is reflected in the figure above. (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009). In the
figure above, the welfarist institution has lower expected returns to capital than an
institutionalist organization due to a combination of factors including, but not limited to,
lending smaller amounts to clients at a greater interest rate over a shorter period of time,
in comparison to institutionalist organizations. While welfarist organizations are
distributing a higher volume of loans in terms of the number of loans to clients, the
institutionalist organization is lending larger levels of capital in smaller overall volume to
predominantly the entrepreneurial poor. This distinction between the average loan
balance of the institution, coupled with the difference in the optimal interest rate of these
organizations, directly impacts the potential profit of the MFI.
Microfinance institutions, especially those holding to an institutionalist mission,
will be less likely to lend to borrowers who are willing to pay greater than the optimal
interest rate. In either case, loans beyond this rate hold too much potential risk for the
lending institution, even for the welfarist institution; while the returns on such a loan will
be much greater due to the interest accrued, the risk of default is also higher, creating a
lower net return than could be made at 𝑟̽�.̽ Lending institutions ration credit in this
scenario as the demand of potential borrowers for capital is not equal to the supply of

loans an institution can afford to lend in order to maintain operations, much in the same
way credit is rationed in the formal banking sector (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Conversely, welfarist institutions are less likely to ration credit and take on greater risk
associated with the collateral-less poor households that predominantly demand shorter
term, higher risk loans. As previously stated, the optimal interest rate is determined in
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part by the demographic served and becomes a secondary outcome of the adopted
mission.
This link between the optimal interest rate and organizational mission will be
measured in the empirical analysis by including the variable “risk coverage” as a proxy
for interest rate. This variable is a ratio of the impairment loss of the organization and the
portfolio of the MFI that is at risk of default greater than thirty days (complete definitions
are included in Appendix C). It demonstrates the amount of risk the MFI must cover
based upon rates of loan default by present clients; this value directly impacts the overall
profit of the organization and offers insight in to the health of the organization in terms of
maintaining operations.
Determining the optimal interest rate based upon the client base served and
assumed repayment rates becomes vital to microfinance institutions in order to maintain
operations; it is a balance between generating an appropriate return on investment while
serving the chosen target demographic. Rosenberg (2002) presents a basic equation that
can be used in order to determine the sustainable interest rate (𝑟̂ ) and is a function of five
basic variables and relies heavily on the principles discussed by Christen (1997) that
influence the optimal interest rate of microfinance institutions. The equation is presented
to practitioners of microfinance as means to determine their optimal interest rate given
their current clientele; neither the Rosenberg article nor the Christen book includes
empirical testing of this equation.
𝑟̂ =

𝐴𝐸 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐾 − 𝐼𝐼
1 − 𝐿𝐿

Administrative Expense Rate (AE) is comprised of all annual recurrent costs to
the MFI with the exception of the cost of funds and loan losses. The loan loss rate (LL) is
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the “annual loss due to uncollectible loans” and usually falls between one to two percent
per annum; if this ratio is greater than 5%, the institution is considered unviable. As
welfarist institutions are lending to a riskier population, it is assumed that their loan loss
rate (LL) will be higher than an institutionalist organization. Cost of funds (CF) is the
future cost of capital based upon present commercial rates of capital; in this scenario, it
includes the baseline equity of an organization less the financial and fixed assets and
liabilities held. The Capitalization Rate (K) is the real profit rate set as a target in order to
maintain long-term growth by the institution. Investment Income Rate (II) is the “income
expected from the MFI’s financial assets other than the loan portfolio” (p. 4)
The model above as presented by Rosenberg (2002) is based upon institutionalist
assumptions directly applied to MFIs following a formal banking model. Welfarist
organizations may substitute an administrative component that affects the interest rate
assigned to loans; these organizations replace investment income rate and recover from a
greater loan loss rate than an institutionalist organization with grants or subsidies in order
to supplement their operating costs; investment income or equity in this case is equal to
the rate of subsidization required to maintain operations. This decreases the impact of
loan losses and administrative expenses associated with the higher volume of loans
distributed by these organizations; in addition, investment income becomes obsolete as
many welfarist institutions do not have an equity building element in their balance sheet
(i.e. every dollar that enters the MFI leaves and any interest earned plus subsidies
received cover administrative expenses). In other words, the subsidy the welfarist
organization receives to cover operating costs and loan losses in many ways serves the
organization in a similar fashion to what investment income provides the institutionalist
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organization. However, it is assumed that the subsidy received does not fluctuate in the
same manner that investment income may, given that it is a pre-determined capital
transfer from the funding organization to the MFI. It may be adjusted as the MFI
generates increased or decreased levels of profit over time.
In order to demonstrate this distinction, Table 2.6.1 outlines the adjustments to the
Rosenberg equation discussed above, adapting it from its original form in order to reflect
a welfarist philosophy. This is done by adding S to represent subsidies or grants that the
MFI receives to reduce the impact of loan losses and higher administrative costs
associated with distributing loans to core poor households; subsidies replace investment
income in the equation for welfarist institutions. Subsidies, as a fraction of the total
income, in this scenario are subtracted from the other factors in the same manner as
investment income.
Table 2.6.1: Components of Institutionalist and Welfarist MFIs Optimal Interest
Rate Adapted from Rosenberg Equation
Institutionalist Interest Rate (MFIh)
Welfarist Interest Rate (MFIℓ)
𝑟̂ =

𝐴𝐸 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐾 − 𝐼𝐼
1 − 𝐿𝐿

𝑟̂ =

𝐴𝐸 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐾 − 𝑆
1 − 𝐿𝐿

The chosen interest rate of a MFI is influenced not only by the perceived risk of
clients but also by the administrative structure of the organization. Institutionalist
organizations have lower interest rates but lend larger amounts of capital to clients who
carry less perceived risk of default. In addition, these organizations are predominantly
profit generating and re-invest these profits into investments in order to increase the
financial depth of the organization. Welfarist organizations distribute loans at higher
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interest rates and lend smaller amounts of capital to clients. As these organizations are
predominantly not-for-profit, they rely on grants to subsidize operations and assist in the
absorption of loan losses. As the interest rate is linked to the mission of the institution,
this value and its components can assist in analyzing the overall health of the
organization and links to the intended outcomes of the organization.
The variable “Risk Coverage” serves as a proxy for the optimal interest rate of the
lending institution in the empirical analyses in Chapter Four. However, several elements
are linked to the administration of loans to the two types of poor. These elements will be
controlled for by institutional variables including profit margin, gross loan portfolio, and
operational self-sufficiency, as each of these variables addresses an aspect of Rosenberg’s
equation; complete definitions of these variables are included in Appendix C.
Given the distinction between the composition of the optimal interest rate and the
corresponding components of that rate for each organizational type based upon the
assumptions of their adopted mission and the profit they need to generate in order to
maintain operations, the relationship between these factors and the assumed return on the
loan can be examined by the classification of each MFI and the designation of borrower
type within the mission. The intended use of the loan and the assumed gross returns on
the project also become factors influencing the amount a MFI is willing to lend to their
target demographic, which are linked to the optimal interest rate being used as a
screening device for the lending institution (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
It is assumed that the two types of borrowers (core poor and entrepreneurial poor)
will use the capital distributed to them in a different manner, where the MFI assumes a
loan distributed to the entrepreneurial will be used in a business venture, while capital
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given to a core poor household has a greater likelihood to be used for consumption
smoothing over a shorter term. These assumptions are not necessarily mutually exclusive
to each group of borrowers but for the sake of this argument loans are distributed in this
manner.
For each proposed project by a potential borrower, there is an expected return or
repayment in a given time period and the assumed risk associated with each individual
project is correlated with the type of borrower; broadly, this means that the expected
return for the core poor is less than that of an entrepreneurial poor household and the
interest rate assigned will be larger to compensate for assumed loss on returns and risk
associated with the former type of household (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, p. 395).
Assuming the core poor household uses the loan for consumption smoothing, the lending
institution will provide them with a smaller loan, as they have a greater risk of default
and smaller returns on the loan. The entrepreneurial poor will have a higher rate of return
on the investment and lower risk, compared to the core poor; in this case, it is assumed
that the MFI will lend the entrepreneurial poor a larger amount of capital at a lower
interest rate, given this demographic holds less risk.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) discuss credit rationing and the application of this to
particular demographics. In terms of the target market of the MFI, the endowments held
by their clients, and the perception of risk associated with each target market, influences
the amount a MFI may choose to lend to a particular demographic. The discussion of loan
use and the expected returns for particular types of households relates back to the mission
of the organization and the institutions’ intended outcomes. It can be assumed that loan
use and the returns to the funding institution could potentially be more important in the
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lending process for institutionalist organizations because these organizations are seeking
to maximize their profits in order to be self-sustaining. These institutions will choose to
lend to the entrepreneurial poor over the core poor. Framed with in the argument laid out
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), institutionalist MFIs will ration credit between potential
borrowers, choosing to lend to the entrepreneurial poor over the core poor as this
demographic carries less risk and it is assumed that they will yield a higher return on
investment, on average.
The amount lent to each type of borrower is linked to the assumed risk associated
with the proposed project or loan use that is funded by the microloan disseminated. An
additional element in the perception of household risk can be discussed in the relationship
between the interest rate assigned to a household and the profits generated by the loan
which go to both the borrower and the lending entity. The household’s initial capital
endowment also plays a role in this relationship; this can also be framed as collateral.
Both the lending institution and the household receiving the loan in the subsequent
discussion are considered risk averse, instead of risk neutral as is assumed in the theory
outlined by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The collateral associated with a core poor
household is assumed to be at or close to zero, while entrepreneurial poor households
have collateral that is greater than core poor households but less than the amount required
by the formal lending market. This links back to the stock of capital or endowment held
by each type of household.
The risk involved with lending to either type of target market is partially
mitigated by the interest rate assigned to the loan and reflected in the amount of and the
term of the loan itself, as discussed above. For example, poorer households demand
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smaller loans at shorter terms and have little to no physical assets that can be used as
collateral. Therefore, the returns on the project are impacted by the initial amount
borrowed by the household and the interest rate assigned to that household (𝑟̂ ) (also
assuming here that the MFI can determine the optimal interest rate (𝑟̽�)̽ by which to
distribute capital to a range of borrowers). The amount borrowed by core poor

households (ℓ) is less than entrepreneurial poor households (h). The interest rates
associated with these loans follow the same logic as previously, where the interest rate
assigned to core poor households is greater than the rate assigned to an entrepreneurial
poor household. According to this rationale, building on the assumptions of credit
rationing in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the interest rate of an institution can be used as a
screening device, where the relationship between the net returns on the loan and the
amount borrowed are directly related to the collateral held by the household.
Therefore, one can distinguish between a loan disseminated by either welfarist or
institutionalist organizations due to the net returns which are allocated to either a core
poor or entrepreneurial poor households. Assuming that the collateral of core poor
households is at or close to zero, the net returns to this group will be much less than that
of the entrepreneurial poor, given the latter has a greater initial endowment and larger
capital to output ratio, as postulated by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010). As both the
borrower and lending institution are risk averse, ideally each will minimize risk to
themselves. Along this vein of reasoning, the borrower will not take out a loan it knows it
cannot repay; the lender will not offer a loan to a household it knows will default.
In summary of the applications of credit rationing to the type of household and
classification of MFI, the net return to the core poor borrower is less than the return to the
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entrepreneurial poor borrower, and similarly, the net return to the lender is smaller from
the core poor borrower than the entrepreneurial poor borrower, despite the higher interest
rate of charged by the welfarist institution. Therefore, MFIs holding to an institutionalist
philosophy of lending will be more likely to lend at a greater rate to entrepreneurial poor
households compared to core poor households due to the link in their mission to creating
a financially sustainable organization. The former borrower type holds less risk for the
lending institution, is more likely to repay their loans, and holds increased potential for
higher returns on the initial investment compared to the core poor borrower.
Competition for potential borrowers is increasing across the entire microfinance
industry, resulting in a price increase across the entire market in terms of costs of
production because the welfarist MFI (which is assumed to be the baseline theoretical
institution) no longer has a monopoly in the market (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005;
Vogelgesang, 2003). Assuming the standard impacts of competition on the market as a
whole, any cross-subsidization in the form of government or international agency grants
becomes obsolete because the net losses based upon the new pricing structure cannot be
covered by this subsidy. On the whole, poorer borrowers are now driven out of the MFI
market due to the “price” of lending and return to informal lending options in order to
cover budget shortfalls.
Each of these elements will be included in the empirical analyses and subsequent
discussion. As microfinance institutions can determine the risk of households and assign
a corresponding interest rate based upon the perceived production function of the
borrower, which is linked to the capital endowments the target market may initially hold,
risk for the MFI can be mitigated given that information asymmetries are reduced over
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time. Assuming there are two types of potential loan recipients and two corresponding
forms of lending institutions, the profit of the latter will vary based upon the demographic
of borrower targeted by the institution, the interest rate assigned to these borrowers, and
the average rate of return on the loans disseminated. Given these theoretical assumptions,
microfinance institutions wishing to maximize their profits, will lend larger loan balances
to less risky households rather than opting for the higher risk loans at shorter terms and
decreased returns, which are associated with the entrepreneurial poor and core poor
respectively. This “drift” towards the institutionalist mindset is manifested through an
increase in the average loan balance of loans distributed and the major charter or legal
type entering the market. This specific relationship will be tested in the regression
analyses to follow in Chapter Four.
2.7 Institutional Environment and Its Influence on Microfinance
Beyond the type of borrower and the tools the MFI chooses to utilize in serving
its target market, the institutional environment also impacts the outcomes of the
organization, including the degree of governance within financial markets as well as the
level of political stability within a country. Regulating bodies may choose to implement a
variety of policies guiding financial markets within a country. In addition, the stability of
the political climate within a country impacts the ability of such entities to govern and
inform the regulations of financial markets (Weber, 2004).
One such monetary tool available to regulators is their ability to regulate the value
of their currency, in terms of the cost of capital within international markets. The cost of
capital, which is determined by the formal credit markets, both domestically and
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internationally, directly influences the profit function of MFIs based upon the selected
institutional framework and its subsequent assumptions.
As MFIs have an increased likelihood of return on investment from the
entrepreneurial poor as opposed to the core poor, many argue that by lending exclusively
to the former, MFIs assist in increasing the absorptive capacity of a community and in
turn strengthening the local economy through this practice. This can be attributed to the
spillover effects or social mobilization generated by employment opportunities through
the new or enhanced businesses created by micro-loans and the creation of knowledge
clusters around specific micro-industries (Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters, 2011;
Maloney, 2002; Dale, 2001; Wibbles, 2006; Zeller and Johanssen, 2006). In the long
term, these spillover effects provide a contextualized solution to poverty through business
opportunities, especially for core poor households.
MFIs serve as a mechanism to strengthen the capital flows to impoverished
households via semi-formal institutions by assisting in the creation of projects that create
positive spillover effects in local communities; however, a direct correlation cannot be
asserted between increased capital endowments of the entrepreneurial poor and the
assumption that these households will automatically be more productive (Karlan and
Morduch, 2009). The entrepreneurial poor have increased levels of absorptive capacity,
given they may have increased skill levels and carry less overall risk than their core poor
counterparts.
It becomes necessary to examine a variety of structural characteristics of a
society, including informal constraints, rule of law and its enforcement, and the
interaction with societal norms. Institutions become a vital component to sustained
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growth in the development discussion, as they reduce uncertainty regarding the terms and
the fulfillment of contracts. Specifically, MFIs can be used by governing entities to foster
corporate governance programs that build capacity and increase partnerships with
development partners (Kansiime, 2009).
In terms of market efficiency and providing capital to the poorest households in a
country, microfinance can be used as a rudimentary lending technology, which can work
as an informal development strategy in underdeveloped institutional environments, such
as those found in the Global South. In this institutional environment, transactions outside
of the formal market provided by microlending entities can serve as a catalyst for
building social capital and employment opportunities for poor households, thus positively
reinforcing the social capital being built by these programs (Dale, 2001; North, 1990;
Dorward, Kydd, Morrison, and Poulton, 2005).
Building on the basic assumptions of the impact of knowledge clusters, access to
capital increases total factor productivity growth for impoverished households who
access credit through MFIs. These institutions serve as an intermediary for capital
investment in industries which can potentially increase national absorptive capacity
within regions, such as business education programs, health insurance, etc. (Maloney,
2002). Within this framework, increasing the overall quality of life of poor households
through access to credit may fund human capital building endeavors such as health
insurance, education expenses, etc. However, as discussed in the previous section of this
chapter, microfinance institutions, especially those aligning with the institutionalist
philosophy of lending, are presently targeting specific sub-populations of impoverished
households such as the entrepreneurial poor in order to reduce the risk absorbed by the
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lending institution and ensure the future borrowing potential of the organization. This
links back to the discussion in Section Six regarding the profit function of the household
and lending institution.
This capacity to engender sustained growth paths in a community is contingent
upon the larger institutional environment in which the MFIs operate and the fluidity (or
restriction) of capital flows to these organizations. The policy framework governing the
flows of capital can ultimately influence the mission chosen by organizations in a given
region based upon the regulatory environment. North (1990) asserts that institutions are
the vehicle by which individuals determine the value of a transaction and the
transformation of that exchange for a good or service. Llanto (1998) frames the influence
of macroeconomic policy on microfinance institutions in terms of the government
providing the necessary tools and appropriate environment for financial institutions to
operate so as to promote efficiently functioning markets and increase the overall
participation of clients in the private sector. In either case, the policy framework
positively or negatively impacts the ability of organizations to sustain operations and
influence the population in general.
If the funding structure of MFIs involves government subsidization, as the policy
environment can restrict or liberalize the capital flows to the organizations, the type of
institutional environment can determine the cost of capital which is available to MFIs. In
the literature, the framework in which these organizations operate ranges from no
regulatory framework to liberalized semi-formal markets to regulation (e.g. Bolivia &
Peru) to direct administration (e.g. Bangladesh). This argument would not hold for those
MFIs reliant upon non-government funds, as the literature suggests that these
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organizations tend to adopt the welfarist approach and do not focus on building a strict
equity-based lending model. Quinones and Seibel (2000) recognize that policy is linked
to the demand for services by poor households; per these authors, as poor households
demand savings at a greater rate than they do credit, government policies promoting the
mobilization of financial services to this demographic include:
...the deregulation of interest rates, permitting financial institutions to offer
attractive saving products with positive real returns and to charge interest
rates on loans which cover their costs and risks and allow for a profit
margin exchange rate deregulation to ease the free flow of private capital
(p. 423).
The practitioners of microfinance, regardless of the source of initial capital, are
left with the challenge of carrying out the mission of the organization in the present
institutional environment. The rules and regulations outlined in governing policies impact
the tools used by practitioners and the framework which a development organization,
such as an MFI, can operate. This interaction ultimately influences the bottom line of the
lending institution and becomes a necessary component of the discussion surrounding the
overall shift in the mission of microfinance institutions (Weber, 2004). If operations are
subsidized by an external source, such as grants, in order to serve a specific population
such as the core poor, then the transfer of these external funds to the MFIs is influencing
the execution of the mission. This interaction of the MFI with its institutional
environment will be tested in Chapter Four through Model Four.
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2.8 Conclusions
Overall, it is assumed that microfinance institutions seek to be financially efficient
organizations while fulfilling their mission. If poor households can create permanent
businesses which employ community members, this may cause positive spillover effects
within the local economy that add to the potential long-term growth in a community
(Hermes, et al., 2011; Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). This also represents a paradigm shift
within the microfinance community from supply-led, subsidized lines of credit to
building MFIs that are self-sustaining. This shift also distinguishes between the
demographic served by each type of MFI as directed by their mission. It is also assumed
that this form of spillover effects will be contained to the local level, and while this can
have a positive effect on the overall macroeconomy, it represents an increase in the
robustness of local economies as opposed to the broader economy, in a bottom up
fashion.
The rift within microfinance affects the outcomes of these organizations. The
schism of microfinance manifests itself through the chosen mission of the organization
and the outcomes associated with each particular type of mission. This split between
rhetoric and action may be attributed to the natural evolution or life-cycle of
microfinance institutions but is also a product of the distinction of a particular target
market that these organizations serve, the desired profit from the distribution of capital
held by the funding entity, and the institutional environment. This tension is not
contained only to microfinance institutions but can be seen in many development based
organizations, seeking to reduce poverty on a global scale.
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The optimal interest rate and its components, also a reflection of the mission of
the organization, inform the discussion of the manner in which microfinance institutions
are evolving on an individual level, from welfarist to institutionalist, and also as an entire
industry. The institutional frameworks in which these organizations operate also impact
the outcomes and inputs of MFIs. The next chapter outlines the data used to test the
relationship between the average loan balances of organizations, whether welfarist or
institutionalist organizations, and the variables that inform the discussion surrounding the
characteristics discussed in the present chapter, which influence the outcomes of the
chosen mission of an organization.

Copyright (c) Bethany Leigh Paris 2013

55

Chapter Three: Data and Methods
3.1 Introduction
In order to illustrate the shift in the lending ideology of microfinance as an
industry, the subsequent analyses will use Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc.
(“MIXMarket”) data to assess the linkages between the charter or legal status of MFIs
and the type of mission which these organizations purport to carry out. This is also
reflected in the average loan balance of an organization, or the average amount lent by
specific MFIs to households, as those MFIs concerned with organizational sustainability
will lend larger loan balances to less risky households.
This “drift” towards the institutionalist mindset is manifested through an increase
in the average loan balance of loans distributed as an industry. This leads to the main
research question used as the foundation for analysis: given that a positive, overall shift
in average loan balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, how does this impact
microfinance institutions and the demographics they target on the intensive and extensive
margins? The goal of this section and the analyses in Chapter Four is to better understand
what factors affect the manifestation of the mission of microfinance organizations and
what specific characteristics of these organizations have the greatest degree of impact,
ranging from internal characteristics to the institutional environment.
3.2 Data
The data used in this analysis were downloaded from MIXMarket
(mixmarket.org), which is produced by the Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc., a
collaboration of multiple global partners such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
CGAP, and Citi Foundation. The resource provides a self-reported, voluntary sample of
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microfinance institutions for multiple years. This sample might or might not be
representative of the overall population of MFIs in the world, and that cannot be assessed
using these data alone. For purposes of summary statistics, the MFIs in the sample might
be larger or better organized, which would be the standard expectation about institutions
that voluntarily report data. The following summary statistics, therefore, are subject to
bias as a result, as smaller institutions are more than likely omitted due to the reduced
levels of administrative capacity which these organizations presently hold. This produces
a speculative effect on the average loan balance as remitted by the organizations in this
sample, although the theory that institutions which are larger make larger loans would
imply a bias toward larger loan size.
For multivariate models, however, the matter is different. If the explanatory
variables adequately explain the dependent variables (average loan balance in level and
change), and if there is no selection bias—unmeasured tendency to report data that is
related to average loan balance—then the regressions are not subject to bias. Thus, the
issue is the adequacy of the specified models, and the data could be considered entirely
satisfactory for that exercise. There is no obvious reason why MFIs would have
unmeasured causes linked to high or low or changing loan balances, as these institutions
are not like idiosyncratic people.
In the self-reported data, the MFIs select which legal type as defined by
MIXMarket most closely resembles the present mission of the organization.
Organizations also submit categories of data including: infrastructure, loan portfolio,
credit products provided, and funding liabilities. These data are then validated by
MIXMarket analysts following the Universal Standards for Social Performance created
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and disseminated by the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF). In addition, the values
submitted by MFIs are adjusted for inflation in a series of four analytical adjustments
which are applied across the submission and account for “the effects of inflation on the
real value of monetary balances” (MIXMarket FAQs, 2013).
Endogeneity may be present in these data as a result of the method of compiling
the data. As the data is self-reporting, there may be entry errors in the data submitted or
MFIs submit data that has been slightly altered from reality. This data set is not a random
sample selection due to the nature of submission; it can be seen in the data that once one
MFI in a specific country or region begin to submit information to MixMarket, others in
the area follow suit, creating a diffusion-esque effect. The information remitted by these
organizations represents those MFIs who have specific characteristics in common,
including support staff and administration that can record and maintain the information
required to submit to MIXMarket. As this is the case, those MFIs with low overhead
costs may not have the resources to submit data to the clearinghouse.
The sample used for the following empirical analyses ranges between the years of
1995 and 2011 and includes 2,251 microfinance institutions in 118 countries from
emerging and transitional economies. The number of MFIs is not constant throughout the
panel, as new MFIs are formed and begin reporting to MIXMarket, while others
discontinue reporting over time. The MIX provides regional classifications for the
countries included in the sample, including Africa (Sub-Saharan), East Asia and the
Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and The Caribbean, Middle East
and North Africa, and South Asia. In addition, MFIs are classified by charter (legal) type
are defined Bank, Credit Union/Cooperative, Non-Bank Financial Institution, Non-
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Government Organization, Rural Banks, and Other (See Table 3.3.2). No MFIs in the
data set change legal type across the panel as submitted to MIXMarket.
The date established was added to the original data downloaded; this was obtained
from the profile pages that MIXMarket creates for each institution on their website. This
information was trimmed by 1% on the bottom (negative numbers only), as several MFIs
submitted a date established entry that was newer than the years of data submitted. For
example, VFS of India submitted data for fiscal years from 2002 through 2005, but
declared the date the organization was established to be 1/23/2006. In such a case, the
date established was adjusted to the first year of submission; this was done for 117
observations in the data. Appendix A shows the complete list of negative date
submissions that were changed in the data, including the original date established as
submitted by the institutions and the years of data submitted by the organizations. For
those organizations that did not remit a “date established” on their profile page, the date
was set as January 1 of the first year the organization submitted data to MIXMarket. This
was done for 130 organizations and a complete list of these organizations is listed in
Appendix B.
Several institutions discontinue remitting information to MIXMarket across the
panel used in this analysis. Many of these organizations submit a reason for this
suspension of submission in the notes section of their profile page as to why this occurs;
Table 3.2.1 (next page) provides a short list of example MFIs which provide such notes.
In addition to MFIs dropping out of the data, 32 MFIs submitted duplicate information
for specific years in the data, which were removed or corrected per the profile page
information. Many organizations submitted updated information for a specific quarter in
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the year (e.g. quarter one of 2012 which was recorded as data for year 2011) or changed
the ending date of the fiscal year which resulted in a double submission for the specific
year; such cases were dropped from the data set and the annual submission was retained
(organizations can distinguish the time period of the submission and is included as a
column in the dataset [quarter versus annual records]).
Table 3.2.1: Examples of and reasons why MFIs drop out of the data over time*
Name

Country

Fundsz Mikro

Poland

Barakot
Pride

Uzbekistan
Zambia

Koshi Yomuti ELO

Namibia

Reason Provided
“...all funds absorbed by FM Bank in
Poland...”
“Operations have been suspended.”
“Institution is no longer operational.”
“Institutional no longer operational as of
12.31.2009”

*Information obtained from profile pages of these specific MFIs at: http://www.mixmarket.org/profiles-reports

3.3 Summary Statistics and Basic MFI Information
The main indicators reflecting the present literature discussing mission drift
within microfinance institutions are the average loan balance of the institution and the
interest rate charged by the institution, which, in these data, is proxied by risk coverage in
the empirical analyses. These variables also serve as a gauge of the overall health of the
organization, in terms of carrying out the intended or assumed outcomes of the
organization, whether institutionalist or welfarist. The table below outlines the charter or
legal types as defined by MIXMarket, along with the organizational umbrella under
which each falls in accordance with the basic definition. These classifications will be
used throughout the empirical analyses.
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Institutionalist Organizations

Table 3.3.2. Charter Type Definitions of Microfinance Institutions
Charter (Legal) Type
Definition
Bank
A licensed financial intermediary regulated by a
state banking supervisory agency. It may provide
any of a number of financial services, such as
deposit taking, lending, payment services, and
money transfers.
Non Bank Financial Institution
An institution that provides similar services to those
(NBFI)
of a Bank, but is licensed under a separate category.
The separate license may be due to lower capital
requirements, to limitations on financial service
offerings, or to supervision under a different state
agency. In some countries this corresponds to a
special category created for microfinance
institutions.
Rural Bank
Banking institution that targets clients who live and
work in non-urban areas and who are generally
involved in agricultural-related activities.

Welfarist Organizations

Non Government Organization
(NGO)

Credit Union/Cooperative

Other*

An organization registered as a nonprofit for tax
purposes or some other legal charter. Its financial
services are usually more restricted, usually not
including deposit taking. These institutions are
typically not regulated by a banking supervisory
agency.
A nonprofit, member-based financial intermediary.
It may offer a range of financial services, including
lending and deposit taking, for the benefit of its
members. While not regulated by a state banking
supervisory agency, it may come under the
supervision of regional or national cooperative
council.
Organization whose services are not encapsulated
by the definitions of other charter types, as
classified by the MFI when data are submitted.

Definitions from MIXMarket glossary
*Other is a legal type used in the data set but the definition is not provided in the MIXMarket glossary

Institutionalist organizations, classified in these data as Banks, NBFIs or Rural
Banks, will have a higher average loan balance and lower interest rate than welfarist
organizations (NGOs and Credit Union/Cooperatives) due to their increased likelihood of
lending to the entrepreneurial poor. Although interest rate is not included as an
explanatory variable, as this information is not included in these data, its components, as
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presented in Rosenberg’s (2002) equation are and will be used as one of the primary
explanatory variables in Models One through Four.
Tables 3.3.3, 3.3.4, and 3.3.5 include basic summary statistics for the five main
descriptive variables used in the subsequent regression analyses which are Average Loan
Balance, Profit Margin, Gross Loan Portfolio, Risk Coverage, and Operational SelfSufficiency; the latter two tables display the information for only institutionalist
organizations and welfarist organizations, respectively. Basic definitions of these
variables are included in the footnotes on the subsequent pages while full definitions are
provided in Appendix C.
Average loan balance serves as the main dependent variable in the subsequent
regressions, as it is assumed that higher values of this variables indicate a scaling up of
operations of the organization while reaching fewer clients (Hermes, Lensink, and
Meesters, 2011). Profit Margin, Gross Loan Portfolio and Operational Self Sufficiency
provide a gauge of the health of the organization, in terms of long term sustainability
measures, which overall support the institutionalist framework of microfinance. Risk
Coverage serves as a proxy variable for interest rate, as the latter value is not provided in
the MIXMarket data; as a ratio of loss and the percentage of the overall portfolio at risk
of default, risk coverage gives an rough estimate of the interest rate that an organization
would need to set in order to cover loan losses, taking into account the estimated risk of
the clientele.
Each of the five variables in the tables below covers a portion of the formula
outlined by Rosenberg (2002), which is discussed at length in the review of the
theoretical literature in Chapter Two. The individual components of these variables were
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not provided by MIXMarket in these data (e.g. Operating Income, Financial Revenue,
Impairment Allowance, etc.), hence the use of the variables generated by these
components in an attempt to replicate the variables included in Rosenberg’s original
formula (e.g. Administrative Expense Rate, Loan Loss Rate, etc.).
The average loan balance disseminated by institutionalist organizations is 2.5
times as great as of welfarist organizations in these data. Compared to institutionalist
organizations, welfarist organizations generate a greater rate of profit, although the MFI
industry, estimated in these data, as a whole posts a loss, based upon the ratio of
operating expenses and total financial revenue of the contributing organizations.

Table 3.3.3: Summary Statistics for MFIs (All)
Mean
Average Loan Balance ($US) 1
Profit Margin 2
Gross Loan Portfolio 3
(scaled by $100,000)
Risk Coverage 4
Operational Self Sufficiency
(%) 5

Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:

11,493
2,179
10,930
2,040
12,406
2,233
8,671
1,842
11,174
2,101

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

$1,579

$20,359

0

$1,531,625

-4.21

350.74

-35,495

729.88

$328.67

$3,065

0

$185,231

2,096.58

96,770

-3.83

4,728,662

1.17

1.28

-2.94

81.22

1

Average Loan Balance: Total value of outstanding loans divided by the number of clients served by the
MFI
2
Profit Margin: the ratio of Operating Income and Financial Revenue
3
Gross Loan Portfolio: All outstanding principal for all outstanding client loans, including current,
delinquent and restructured loans, but not loans that have been written off. It does not include interest
receivable. It does not include employee loans.
4
Risk Coverage: The ratio of Impairment Allowance and the Portfolio at Risk > 30 days
5
Operational Self Sufficiency: Financial Revenue / (Financial Expense + Impairment Loss + Operating
Expense)
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Table 3.3.4: Summary Statistics for MFIs (Institutionalist Organizations Only)
Mean
Average Loan Balance ($US)
Profit Margin
Gross Loan Portfolio
(scaled by $100,000)
Risk Coverage
Operational Self Sufficiency
(%)

Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:

5,147
$2,373
955
4,900
-9.03
895
5,566
$604.21
979
3,940
3,526.15
813
4,975
1.18
910

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

$30,229

0

$1,531,625

523.79

-35,495

729.88

$4,528

0

$185,231

127,581

-3.83

4,728,662

1.12

-2.95

66.34

Table 3.3.5: Summary Statistics for MFIs (Welfarist Organizations Only)
Mean
Average Loan Balance ($US)
Profit Margin
Gross Loan Portfolio
(scaled by $100,000)
Risk Coverage
Operational Self Sufficiency
(%)

Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:
Obs:
n:

6,237
1,188
5,944
1,120
6,720
1,217
4,659
1,006
6,102
1,163

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

$931

$2,963

0

$102,250

-0.27

7.01

-413.32

24.59

$105.85

$493.05

0

$14,084

919.97

60,517

-1.96

4,129,682

1.15

1.39

-1.27

81.22

As seen in the tables above, there is a distinct difference in the variables between
institutionalist and welfarist organizations (charter type “other” was not included in
Tables 3.3.4 and 3.3.5). This is explored further in Table 3.3.6 (proceeding pages) in
which the variables above are displayed by charter or legal type. This table also includes
the number of active borrowers, offices, years of operation, age, scale, region, regulated,
profit status, and target market. Years of operation is a variable generated by the author
that indicates the number of years in which a MFI has provided services to clients. This
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value was calculated by subtracting the year established, as submitted on the
organizations’ profile page, from the years that data were submitted on behalf of the
organization.
Age is a categorical variable calculated by MIXMarket staff and indicates if the
MFI is new, young or mature; this variable does not consistently match up with the
“years of operation” created by the author. Scale is a categorical variable which attempts
to demonstrate the breadth of services offered by the MFI in terms of the operations,
including small, medium, and large scale operations; this variable changes across time as
MFIs grow. Regions, as classified by MIXMarket, are Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and
the Pacific, Latin America and The Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and
South Asia; a complete list of countries included from each region is included in
Appendix C.
Three additional categorical variables are included as they indicate characteristics
of the either the welfarist or institutionalist philosophy of microfinance provision.
“Regulated” allows organizations to indicate if parameters guiding formal market pertain
to the governance of their organization by selecting yes or no; one can assume that those
that are regulated will adhere more closely to the institutionalist ideology; in addition,
there is a link in the literature to the degree of regulation and the overall wealth of the
borrower, where more highly regulated MFIs tend to lend at a greater rate to wealthier
clients (Hartarska and Mersland, 2012). MFIs also indicate whether they fall within the
non-profit or for-profit realm through the variable “Profit Status”; this variable does not
change across time. Via “Target Market,” MFIs select if the services provided by the
organization are broad, high end, low end, or small business which is classified within the
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depth of services provided as a ratio of the average loan balance per borrower to the GNI
per Capita; this may change throughout the panel of years in these data (e.g. KredAqro
NBCO lists its Target Market as Small Business, High End, and Broad across the total
years of submission). Full definitions for all variables included in Tables 3.3.3 through
3.3.6, including definitions of their basic components, are provided in Appendix C.
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Table 3.3.6: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type
Charter (Legal) Type
Bank

Average Loan
Balance
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Profit Margin

Gross Loan
Portfolio (scaled
by $100,000)

Risk Coverage

Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:

1,008
181
2,235
3,353
29,931
0
958
153
-46.61
1,184.09
108.08
35,495.63
2,123
191
2,198.54
9,822.93
185,231.3
0
735
132
3.53
35.52
953.55
-3.83

Cooperative/
Credit Union
Obs:
1,764
n:
429
Mean:
1,766
S.D.:
3,586
Max:
102,250
Min:
0
Obs:
1,742
n:
403
Mean:
-0.14
S.D.:
1.96
Max:
1.64
Min:
-50.42

NBFI
Obs:
3,493 Obs:
n:
360 n:
Mean:
2,667 Mean:
S.D.:
36,484 S.D.:
Max: 1,531,625 Max:
Min:
0 Min:
Obs:
3,260 Obs:
n:
593 n:
Mean:
-0.13 Mean
S.D.:
5.89 S.D.:
Max:
298.29 Max:
Min:
-89.87 Min:

NGO
4,473
759
602
2,606
76,433
0
4,202
717
-0.33
8.24
243.59
-413.32

Rural Bank
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:

646
114
994
8,006
203,315
0
682
149
1.23
27.94
729.88
-3.15

Obs:
2,019 Obs:
3,710 Obs:
4,701 Obs:
733
n:
449 n:
636 n:
768 n:
152
Mean:
141.47 Mean:
217.35 Mean:
90.55 Mean:
119.66
S.D.:
714.98 S.D.:
679.82 S.D.:
356.74 S.D.:
908.95
Max: 14,084.59 Max:
11,753 Max:
6,479 Max:
17,399
Min:
0 Min:
0 Min:
0 Min:
0.004
Obs:
1,267 Obs:
2,671 Obs:
3,392 Obs:
534
n:
356 n:
543 n:
650 n:
138
Mean:
1.44 Mean:
5,198 Mean:
1,263 Mean:
9.71
S.D.:
14.91 S.D.:
154,934 S.D.:
70,925 S.D.:
112.15
Max:
486.71 Max: 4,728,662 Max: 4,129,682 Max: 2,477.32
Min:
-1.96 Min:
-0.68 Min:
-1.06 Min:
0

Other
Obs:
109
n:
36
Mean: 1,181
S.D.:
2,167
Max: 15,708
Min:
14
Obs:
86
n:
25
Mean:
-2.19
S.D.:
16.69
Max:
21.77
Min:
151.16
Obs:
120
n:
37
Mean: 26.64
S.D.:
38.16
Max: 199.65
Min:
0
Obs:
72
n:
23
Mean:
4.16
S.D.:
8.72
Max:
49.96
Min:
0
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Table 3.3.6: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type (continued)
Charter (Legal) Type
Cooperative/
Bank
NBFI
NGO
Credit Union
Obs:
969 Obs:
1,773 Obs:
3,316 Obs:
4,329
n:
157 n:
414 n:
603 n:
749
Operational
Mean:
1.19 Mean:
1.18 Mean:
1.17 Mean:
1.15
Self Sufficiency
S.D.:
2.16 S.D.:
1.07 S.D.:
0.70 S.D.:
1.50
(%)
Max:
66.33 Max:
31.96 Max:
15.037 Max:
81.22
Min:
-2.94 Min:
0.0194 Min:
-0.68 Min:
-1.27
Obs:
1,029 Obs:
1,778 Obs:
3,523 Obs:
4,516
n:
102 n:
431 n:
631 n:
761
Mean:
187,593 Mean:
11,554 Mean:
54,094 Mean:
53,459
Number of
S.D.:
800,967 S.D.:
46,054 S.D.:
265,904 S.D.:
328,20
Active
3
Borrowers
Max
8,519,497 Max:
852,925 Max:
6,242,26 Max:
6,397,6
:
6
35
Min:
0 Min:
0 Min:
0 Min:
0
Obs:
706 Obs:
1096 Obs:
2,362 Obs:
2,815
n:
177 n:
375 n:
565 n:
625
Mean:
86 Mean:
20 Mean:
35 Mean:
45
Offices
S.D.:
296 S.D.:
49 S.D.:
127 S.D.:
213
Max:
4,591 Max:
522 Max:
2,380 Max:
3,334
Min:
1 Min:
0 Min:
0 Min:
0
n:
187 n:
428 n:
607 n:
717
Years in
Operation*
10.84
12.16
7.85
12.32
Obs:
282 Obs:
612 Obs:
1,061 Obs:
1,093
Age
n:
189 n:
429 n:
618 n:
727
New
115
155
383
205
Young
72
192
370
321
Mature
95
265
308
567

Rural Bank

Other

Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:

690
150
1.24
0.26
2.82
0.002
647
145
13,559
25,378

Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:

Max:

311,38
0
28
494
137
13
31
372
0
140
20.52
175
145
19
27
129

Max:

Min:
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:
n:
Obs:
n:

Min:
Obs:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Max:
Min:
n:
Obs:
n:

97
28
1.25
2.04
20.41
0.065
110
36
9,412
19,47
6
142,8
14
0
71
30
13
24
123
1
37
6.92
52
37
22
16
14

Table 3.3.6: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type (continued)
Charter (Legal) Type

Cooperative/
Credit Union

Bank
Obs:
n:

Scale
Small
Medium
Large
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Region
Sub-Saharan
Africa
East Asia and
the Pacific
Eastern Europe
and Central Asia
Latin America
and The
Caribbean
Middle East and
North Africa
South Asia
Regulated

n:
(n: 587)
(n: 292)
(n: 414)

279 Obs:
191 n:
99
65
115
193 n:

NBFI

601 Obs:
449 n:
355
166
80
450 n:

NGO

Rural Bank

1,051 Obs: 1,163 Obs:
636 n:
768 n:
493
679
325
327
233
157
637 n:
771 n:

Other

221 Obs:
152 n:
107
77
37
153 n:

48
37
32
11
5
37

83

173

144

141

40

6

11

33

31

105

103

9

39

130

198

40

0

7

37

83

162

216

0

4

5

0

9

56

0

3

(n: 502)

(n: 73)
(n: 373)
n:

18
188 n:

n:

186
2
183 n:

Yes
No
Profit Status
Non-Profit
Profit

4
179

31
42 n:
2
291
131
40 n:
2
384
14

93
620 n:

213
726 n:

10
145 n:

8
37

437
183
613 n:

221
505
720 n:

136
9
145 n:

23
14
24

102
511

717
3

16
129

11
13

Table 3.3.6: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type (continued)
Charter (Legal) Type
Bank
Target Market
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Broad
High End
Low End
Small Business

Obs:
n:

Cooperative/
Credit Union

1,030 Obs:
182 n:
483
129
241
177

1,794 Obs:
437 n:
1097
172
369
156

NBFI
3,484 Obs:
630 n:
1745
176
1376
187

NGO

Rural Bank
4,480 Obs:
759 n:
1284
72
3075
49

Other
647 Obs:
144 n:
452
30
153
12

110
36
65
5
37
3

*This variable only includes MFIs reporting a date established on the profile page for the organization. Those MFIs in which the years operated was generated by the author are not
included in this information.

As discussed throughout the review of literature and theoretical assumptions
surrounding microfinance, a difference exists in the services offered to poor households
between the welfarist and institutionalist philosophy of lending. This is framed in terms
of the intended outcome of these organizations, which are categorized in this data set as
legal or charter type, and manifests itself through the fulfillment of an organization’s
mission. This is measured in these organizations by the size of average loan balance. In
line with the theoretical considerations of this piece, welfarist organizations will lend
smaller loans to a greater number of borrowers, while institutionalist organizations will
lend larger amounts to fewer borrowers. Core poor households are predominantly served
by welfarist institutions, while institutionalist organizations target individuals and
households that comprise the entrepreneurial poor. There is a direct correlation between
the type of charter status a MFI selects to reflect its mission, the corresponding average
loan balance, and the target market it serves at the given time. As seen in the summary
statistics above (Table 3.3.6), NBFIs and Banks have the largest average loan balance
compared to NGOs and Cooperatives and Credit Unions, which supports the basic
premise that institutionalist organizations will, on average, disseminate larger loan
balances compared to welfarist institutions.
Across the panel of data, average loan balance is increasing for all MFI types. The
direction of change of average loan balance between years was also calculated and the
results indicate that this variable is increasing more frequently than it is decreasing across
time regardless of the charter type for the MFI, as is seen in Table 3.3.7 below. For the
MFIs contributing information to MIXMarket, it seems that in 68% of the paired
observations average loan balance is increasing, while 27% of these pairs decrease across
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time. This variable will be used in the Model Three (outlined in the subsequent sections),
in order to better understand the relationship between the direction of change of average
loan balance and explanatory variables.
Table 3.3.7: Direction of Change of Average Loan Balance (ALB) by Charter Type
Charter Type
Bank
Credit Union/Coop
NBFI
NGO
Rural Bank
Other
Total

Decreasing ALB
238
(29%)
378
(29%)
894
(32%)
1,142
(31%)
121
(25%)
25
(36%)
2,798
(30%)

No Change in ALB
6
(<1%)
3
(<1%)
29
(1%)
58
(2%)
7
(1%)
0
(--)
103
(1%)

Increasing ALB
570
(70%)
905
(70%)
1,896
(67%)
2,458
(67%)
352
(73%)
44
(64%)
6,225
(68%)

In addition to the average loan balance and the direction of change of average
loan balance, years in operation becomes an important indicator of mission drift because
the literature suggests, per the evolution of microfinance hypothesis, which states as
MFIs age they align more closely with the institutionalist or outcome based philosophy of
lending rather than a welfarist ideology. Therefore, as MFIs age they will be more likely
to align with the institutionalist philosophy regardless of charter type; they will not
change charter type but it is assumed that the outcomes of older organizations will
resemble an institutionalist rather than a welfarist perspective.
However, there may be a second layer of organizational evolution, in that, those
organizations reporting to MIXMarket that are also considered young are selecting a
charter type that reflects an institutionalist philosophy, as the industry itself, as it evolves,
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now predominantly reflects this viewpoint. Table 3.3.8 (below) shows that, for the MFIs
reporting to MIXMarket, Banks and NBFIs have steadily increased in terms of volume in
recent years, while NGOs are decreasing and Credit Unions are remaining at similar
levels across time. This indicates, that as an industry, MFIs are now entering the
microfinance industry at a greater rate under the umbrella of outcome and sustainability
driven microbanking.
Table 3.3.8: Count of Observations of the Age of MFIs Institutionalist versus
Welfarist Organizations by Legal Type Reporting to MIXMarket

Years in Operation
0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-40
41-50
Greater than 50

Institutionalist (n: 934)
Welfarist (n: 1,145)
Rural
Credit
Bank
NBFI
NGO
Bank
Union
(Obs: 1130 (Obs: 3652
(Obs: 4571
(Obs: 725
(Obs: 1993
n: 187)
n: 607)
n: 717)
n: 140)
n: 428)
447
1612
83
955
582
237
1022
104
1168
562
198
605
157
1102
438
123
245
81
716
142
52
102
52
345
46
27
31
67
145
30
25
23
106
98
90
6
8
57
27
93
15
4
18
15
9

Rural banks report the greatest profit margin compared to the other charter types
in these data, with Banks posting the lowest degree of profit. In theory, it is assumed that
institutionalist organizations will post a higher margin of profit compared to welfarist
organizations; other than rural banks, all MFI legal types in this sample post a negative
profit margin. In addition to profit margin, risk coverage can indicate the overall health of
the organization, as this variable includes the ratio of the loan portfolio which is at risk of
default, in terms of loan loss impairment and the percentage of missed payments for
thirty day increments (i.e. the greater the value of this ratio the riskier the portfolio).
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Number of active borrowers is included as an explanatory variable because it
links to a mission determined factor, in which it is assumed that welfarist organizations
will lend smaller loan balances to a greater number of clients, while institutionalist
organizations will lend larger loan balances to a smaller number of clients. The number
of offices also speaks to a similar relationship to mission philosophy as does number of
active borrowers. Theoretically, welfarist institutions will have a greater number of
offices compared to their institutionalist counterparts, as a means of the former reaching a
broader client base than the latter; this can also influence factors such as profit margin
and operational self-sufficiency as the overhead costs of welfarist organizations will be
greater due to the volume of offices it maintains.
Several categorical variables are included as explanatory variables, as they assist
in the explanation and links to intended mission outcomes. Per previous discussion
regarding the evolution of microfinance, it is assumed that those MFIs classified as
“mature” in terms of their age will have a greater likelihood to adhere to an
institutionalist philosophy. Within the variable target market, there seems to be the most
movement between categories that institutions are reporting across the panel. Per the
definitions of the groups for target market, it seems that high end and small business best
align with the institutionalist philosophy of lending, while low end aligns with welfarist;
broad is an all-encompassing category that many MFIs seem to be switching to over time
in the panel. The entrance of or switch to broad may also indicate external pressure to
increase inclusion of an extensive range of clients by board members or funding agencies.
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3.4 Links to Concepts and Theory
The concept of a MFI being institutionalist or welfarist refers to its actual
emphasis on the core poor or entrepreneurial poor as the target demographic of the
organization. There is not a single variable in these data that matches the reflection of the
organization’s mission exactly, therefore, charter or legal type is a proxy for this. While
there can be some uncertainty about the goals of an institution, and mission drift can
occur on the internal or external margin, which is the point of this research; a bank is
clearly different from an NGO or credit union or cooperative, in terms of the target
market of the organization and the services offered.
The targeting of particular demographic groups is a basic concept in categorizing
MFIs. In this case, a self-reported variable is available in the data, namely “target
market,” which is small business, high end, broad, or low end. This variable changes over
time for individual MFIs in the sample used; as such, it can represent the dynamic
changes in particular MFIs choosing to serve a particular demographic. This can also
represent mission drift as a MFI may move from designating “low end” to “broad” as
their target demographic.
The mission of the organization, in general, and drift within the mission of the
institution are reflected within average loan balance. In this case, all MFI research is
based on the idea that the core poor differ in their uses of loans and in their receiving
smaller loans on average, while the entrepreneurial poor receive larger loans on average.
The use of average loan balance is well established as the measure of the concept of
mission (Hishigsuren, 2007; Morduch and Haley, 2002; Mersland and Strøm, 2010).
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The subsequent analyses will test the theory and related main hypothesis that
MFIs with larger average loan balances are also serving households closer to the
subsistence poverty level (considered the entrepreneurial poor in the theoretical section),
as opposed to those considered the core poor. The first model is a basic OLS, fixed
effects regression model testing the relationship between average loan balance and the
explanatory variables, as outlined above, that most reflect the mission of the organization,
whether it is classified as institutionalist or welfarist, including gross loan portfolio,
number of active borrowers, age, etc.
An increase in average loan balance can be seen the summary statistics across all
legal types, which indicates at first pass that all MFIs are moving more towards an
institutionalist perspective of lending; this is the basic premise of mission drift in this
analysis. The phenomenon of mission drift directly impacts the rationale used in
advocating for microfinance in impoverished and/or rural communities, as the mission of
these institutions more often than not falls within the welfarist approach to microfinance,
especially those aligning with the not-for-profit ideology. In addition, as discussed in the
theory section and previously in this chapter, one could assume that welfarist
organizations will disseminate small loans to poorer households while institutionalist
organizations lend larger amounts of capital to less poor households. However, in these
data it seems that regardless of institution type (which is not changing across time)
average loan balance is increasing over time. This rate of change will be examined in the
second fixed effects model, as the first difference of the dependent variable will be
regressed against the outlined explanatory variables.
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Model Three, again, utilizes a transformed dependent variable, where the
direction of change between years, classified as decreasing (-1), unchanged (0), or
increasing (+1), will be used to explain the overall shift in average loan balance in terms
of the chosen explanatory variables. The final model takes into account macro-level
variables (defined in Appendix D) in order to control for factors that influence a
microfinance institution’s financial and organizational environment, which are
considered benchmark indicators of development and institutional stability throughout a
country, including variables from the World Bank and Polity IV Stability index.
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Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis
4.1 Introduction
Returning to the basic research question and taking into account how the baseline
statistics discussed in Chapter Three reflect the differences regarding the legal status of
institutions, we can now proceed to the discussion surrounding the rationale for the
subsequent regression analyses. To reiterate, the basic research question is: given that a
positive, overall shift in average loan balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission,
how does this impact microfinance institutions and the demographics they target on the
intensive and extensive margins? This question, though seemingly simple, becomes quite
complex when discussing the population served, the measures of organizational
sustainability and the institutional environment, and the intended outcomes of the
organization.
As discussed at length in the theoretical section of the review of literature, a
“schism” exists between the mission of the organization and the actual outcomes of
microfinance organizations, framed in terms of loans disseminated to individual
households (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Welfarist institutions, categorized as
NGOs or Cooperative/Credit Unions in these analyses, will lend at a greater rate to
poorer households, while institutionalist organizations such as Banks or NBFIs will lend
to less poor households. In the mission rhetoric of these organizations, each specifically
defines its intended outcome but these intended results may or may not become reality in
the day to day operations of the organization for a variety of reasons.
Average loan balance, as provided by MIXMarket, serves as an indicator of the
degree to which the MFI is carrying out its assumed mission. In this respect, welfarist
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institutions will have a lower average loan balance as compared to institutionalist
organizations. While not all organizations fall cleanly into either category, there is a trend
across the data, as seen in the summary statistics in the previous chapter (Table 3.3.6).
The first regression model, below, shows the basic unit change analysis between average
loan balance and the explanatory variables listed. Each explanatory variable indicates an
aspect of the categorization of the MFIs in these data, in terms of the organizational
structure and its relationship to the clients of the organization. Based upon the literature,
it is assumed that welfarist institutions will profit less, have smaller loan portfolios, have
riskier portfolios, and be less self-sufficient in terms of monthly operations, as compared
to institutionalist organizations.
4.2 Fixed Effects Regressions
The following four models use average loan balance and basic transformations of
this variable to better inform the discussion surrounding mission drift in microfinance
institutions, while controlling for variables that reflect the administration of loans to
clients of the organization.
4.2.a Model One
The following model estimates the degree of interaction between the average loan
balance of the organization against specific characteristics of the organizations that
influence the intended outcomes of the institution, controlling for the charter type, region,
scale, level of regulation, profit status, and target market of each specific MFI; within
these categorical variables, the omitted or control variables are, respectively: new, bank,
Sub-Saharan Africa, small, yes, for-profit, and broad. The number of observations for the
“offices” variable was significantly less than that of other variables (originally 7,544
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observations compared to 11,492). Because of this, the value was set to zero for those
MFIs with the number offices missing in the data and a missing dummy variable was
generated to account for some of the selection bias within the sample.
A fixed effects model, as opposed to a random or between effects model, is used
in this case because the correlation between the unobserved effect and each explanatory
variable was not sufficiently close zero (correlation between fixed effect and fitted value
= -0.1002); in other words, the correlation of the fixed effect and the fitted value for each
explanatory variable is statistically significant from zero; the standard error is
approximately 0.0227. Fixed effects, as opposed to random effects, are used in this and
the subsequent models because a random effects model would introduce bias into the
estimation. This cross-sectional, time-series regression model allows for estimation
across time, while controlling for each individual microfinance institution.
Model One: Average Loan Balance = β0 + β1profitmargin + β2grossloanportfolio +
β3riskcoverage + β4operationalselfsufficiency + β5years_operating +
β6numberofactiveborrowers + β7offices + β8miss_office+ β9legaltype + β10region +
β11scale + β12regulated + β13profit_status + β14target_market + αi +εit.

Table 4.2.1: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed-Effects Model
(Model One)
Dependent Variable:
Explanatory Variables:
Profit Margin
Gross Loan Portfolio
Risk Coverage
Operational Self Sufficiency
Years in Operation
Number of Active Borrowers
Offices
Miss_Offices
Age_Young
Age_Mature

Average Loan Balance
(Obs: 10,934)
(Groups: 1,971)
-0.2070
0.2616
-0.0036
-6.0850
69.9535
-0.0015
1.4545
183.6756
-265.2852
-110.3619
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2.648
0.032
0.0002
22.719
14.027
0.0002
0.387
71.253
128.054
87.046

***

***
***
***
**
**

Table 4.2.1: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed-Effects Model
(Model One) (continued)
Average Loan Balance
(Obs: 10,934)
(Groups: 1,971)
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
-181.6653
92.262
-248.8888
123.174
{omitted}
{omitted}
1325.0250
140.069
-200.3717
90.156
4077.8150
188.640

Dependent Variable:
Legal_Cooperative
Legal_NBFI
Legal_NGO
Legal_Rural Bank
Region_East Asia
Region_Eastern Europe
Region_LAC
Region_MENA
Region_South Asia
Scale_Medium
Scale_Large
Regulated_No
ProfitStatus_Profit
TargetMarket_Highend
TargetMarket_Lowend
TargetMarket_Smallb
Rho

**
**

***
**
***

0.6964
Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Omitted variables are included in and accounted for by the fixed effect

The basic regression model above produces rather intuitive results as framed by
the theory previously discussed regarding welfarist and institutionalist organizations.
There is a positive and significant relationship between the gross loan portfolio and the
average loan balance (ALB) disseminated; on average, as the organizations’ gross loan
portfolio increases, so does the average loan balance disseminated by the organization.
Similarly, as the institution increases in age, the ALB disseminated by that organization
also increases. Specifically, there seems to be a decrease in ALB within young
organizations compared to new organizations. In addition, as the number of borrowers
increases, the ALB decreases.
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Contrary to the theory discussed above regarding the number of branches which a
MFI maintains, ALB is estimated to increase as the number of offices increases, all else
equal. Compared to those MFIs reporting the number of offices, those who do not report
this value have a positive and statistically significant relationship with ALB. As the scale
of the organization increases, there seems to be a significant and negative relationship
with ALB compared to small organizations, much like number of active borrowers.
Target market presents interesting results; compared to the category “broad,” targeting
high end and small business clients has a positive effect on ALB, while low end has a
negative effect on ALB. The variance explained by the entire model was 0.6964, which
can be considered significant but leaves room for improvement in terms of the variability
of the explanatory variables within the model.
4.2.b Models Two and Three
One of the basic assumptions of the theoretical considerations supporting these
analyses is that welfarist organizations will lend smaller amounts to a greater number of
borrowers; conversely, institutionalist MFIs will lend larger amounts to fewer loan
recipients. However, across the sample of MFIs in these data, the average loan balance is
increasing, regardless of this mission or organizational classification, both on the
intensive and extensive margin. As average loan balance is increasing over time, the
degree to which it is increasing, shown as a percent change per unit, will add to the
understanding of the interaction between this variable and the explanatory variables (as
seen in Table 3.3.7 in the Summary Statistics section). The first difference of average
loan balance (ALB) was calculated for each MFI that submitted information for multiple
years in the sample (variable d_average); this was then categorized as decreasing,
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increasing or remaining constant (variable d_sign) between groups of two across the
years of submission.
Table 4.2.2: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type for Rate of Change
Variables
Charter (Legal) Type

Obs: 814
n:
154
201
Obs: 814
n:
154

Cooperative/
Credit
Union
Obs: 1,286
n:
343
231
Obs: 1,286
n:
343

238

378

894

1,142

121

25

6

3

29

58

7

--

570

905

1,896

2,458

352

44

Bank

d_average
d_sign
decreasing
(-1)
constant
(0)
increasing
(+1)

NBFI

Rural
Bank

NGO

Obs: 2,819 Obs: 3,685 Obs:
n:
558 n:
704 n:
-311
47
Obs: 2,819 Obs: 3,658 Obs:
n:
558 n:
704 n:

Other

480
121
56
480
121

Obs:
n:

69
23
-58
Obs: 69
n:
23

Similar to the basic model, models two and three (outlined below) estimate the
degree of interaction between the rate of change in the average loan balance of the
organization against specific characteristics of the organizations that influence the
intended outcomes of the institution, controlling for the same explanatory variables listed
in the basic model. Again, a fixed effects model as opposed to a random or between
effects model is used based upon the same assumptions as discussed in Model One, with
the correlation between fixed effect and the fitted value being -0.2196 and -0.6416 in
Models Two and Three, respectively.
The first variation of the basic regression model will regress the percentage
change per year or first difference of average loan balance against the explanatory
variables used in Model One. The regression equation is as follows:
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Model Two: % change (or first difference) of ALB = β0 + β1profitmargin +
β2grossloanportfolio + β3riskcoverage + β4operationalselfsufficiency + β5years_operating
+ β6numberofactiveborrowers + β7offices + β8miss_office+ β9legaltype + β10region +
β11scale + β12regulated + β13profit_status + β14target_market +αi +εit.
The second iteration of the basic regression model will regress the direction of
change of the average loan balance (negative, positive, or no change) against the
explanatory variables used in Model One, using the same fixed effects assumptions as
discussed. The regression equation is as follows:
Model Three: d_sign = β0 + β1profitmargin + β2grossloanportfolio + β3riskcoverage +
β4operationalselfsufficiency + β5years_operating + β6numberofactiveborrowers +
β7offices + β8miss_office+ β9legaltype + β10region + β11scale + β12regulated +
β13profit_status + β14target_market + αi + εit.
Table 4.2.3: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed Effects Models
(Models Two and Three)
Dependent Variable:
Explanatory Variables:
Profit Margin
Gross Loan Portfolio
Risk Coverage
(scaled by 10,000)
Operational Self
Sufficiency
Years in Operation
Number of Active
Borrowers
(scaled by 10,000)
Offices
Miss_Offices
Age_Young
Age_Mature

Model Two:
First Difference of ALB
(Obs: 8,782)
(Groups: 1,749)
0.1689
0.0619

2.047
0.027 **

Model Three:
Direction of Change in ALB
(Obs: 8,782)
(Groups: 1,749)
0.0011
0.000649

0.0012
0.000163 ***

-1.2940

2.621

-.0000945

31.5566

29.698

0.04465

0.0175 **

-1.1569

11.162

-0.02224

0.00657 ***

-2.8200

1.966

-0.00371

0.00116 ***

0.2779
91.6661
-159.6556
-50.5367

0.308
58.407
104.762
68.907

0.000511
-0.1258
0.02841
0.8216

0.000181 **
0.0344 ***
0.0617
0.0406 **
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0.000154

Table 4.2.3: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed Effects Models
(Models Two and Three) (continued)
Dependent Variable:

Legal_Cooperative
Legal_NBFI
Legal_NGO
Legal_Rural Bank
Region_East Asia
Region_Eastern Europe
Region_LAC
Region_MENA
Region_South Asia
Scale_Medium
Scale_Large
Regulated_No
ProfitStatus_Profit
TargetMarket_Highend
TargetMarket_Lowend
TargetMarket_Smallb
Rho

Model Two:
First Difference of ALB
(Obs: 8,782)
(Groups: 1,749)
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
-73.7082
-105.2336
{omitted}
{omitted}
689.5849
-127.5008
1,784.8640

71.966
100.055

114.479 ***
73.133 *
188.587 ***

0.5056

Model Three:
Direction of Change in ALB
(Obs: 8,782)
(Groups: 1,749)
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
-0.1997
-0.2357
{omitted}
{omitted}
0.3322
-0.4092
0.7888

0.0424 **
0.0589 ***

0.0674 ***
0.0431 ***
0.915 ***

0.4520
Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Omitted variables are included in and accounted for by the fixed effect

As in the basic regression, the categorical variables legal status, region, regulated,
and profit status were included in and accounted for by the fixed effect utilized in this
regression. Between Models Two and Three, there seems to be significant differences in
terms of the prediction of the overall model and the interaction between the direction of
change and the classification of this change. The fraction of the variance between the
explanatory variables explained by Model Two is greater than that of Model Three.
However, there are a greater number of significant interactions between the dependent
variable and explanatory variables in the third model in comparison to the second.
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In terms of the overall rate of change in Model Two, only gross loan portfolio and
the target market seem to have a significant interaction with the rate of change of average
loan balance across the sample, which are quite intuitive. As the gross loan portfolio of
an organization increases over time, the average loan balance also increases across the
panel, all else equal. In addition, following a similar pattern of the results of Model One,
compared to those MFIs targeting a broad lending base, those targeting a high end or
small business generating base see a general increase over time in average loan balance;
those targeting lower end borrowers have a correlating decrease in average loan balance,
on average.
The predictive power of Model Three is less than that of Model Two, but it yields
significant results on a greater number of total explanatory variables. The third model can
be considered a multivariate sign test and interpreted much like a probit regression, in
terms of unit change interpretations, given the classification ranges between positive and
negative one. Gross loan portfolio, operational self-sufficiency, and the number of offices
which a microfinance institution maintains have a positive and statistically significant
impact on the direction of change of average loan balance; compared to new
organizations, the average loan balance of mature organizations has a higher probability
to increase over time. On average, compared to those organizations that target a broad
client base, those that concentrate on lending to high end and small business based
borrowers have positive interaction on the direction of change of average loan balance; in
other words, MFIs targeting high end and small business based clients have a positive
directional change in average loan balance across time.
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Conversely, as the number of active borrowers increases, the average loan balance
of the organization tends to decrease over time. In addition, as the number of years an
institution has been operating increases, in contrast to the MIXMarket categorical
variable age, the average loan balance of the organization is predicted to decrease, all else
equal. Organizations targeting low end borrowers compared to those that target a broad
base have a negative relationship with direction of change of the average loan balance in
this sample, on average. In addition, compared to those organizations serving less than
two million borrowers (classified as small scale), the probability that ALB increases over
time in medium and large scale MFIs results in a negative relationship.
From the initial fixed effects models performed and discussed in this section, it
seems that there is not a significant difference for the average loan balance between the
different charter types in this sample, and one can conclude, holding all else equal, that
average loan balance is in fact not being influenced by the legal status of an organization.
However, the gross loan portfolio and the target market of the organization have a
significant impact on average loan balance and the rate at which it changes over time in
the sample used, as is seen across all three models. These results indicate that average
loan balance is changing across time, predominantly in a positive direction, while a
smaller component of MFIs are decreasing this value or not changing it over time. This
supports the secondary hypothesis that the entire sub-sector of microfinance is drifting
toward an institutionalist philosophy of microlending, as those MFIs that are increasing
their average loan balance across time are doing so at a greater rate than those choosing
not to change this value. In addition, newer MFIs entering the microcredit market are
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doing as a legal status that falls under the umbrella of the institutionalist philosophy of
lending, with NBFIs and Banks comprising a greater number of new MFIs in these data.
4.2.c Model Four
Institutional environment may also be playing a key role in influencing the
outcomes of MFIs that may not be accounted for in Models One through Three. As the
discussion of theoretical considerations outlines, institutional and macroeconomic factors,
such as the flow of capital and level of political stability within a country, can influence
the absorptive capacity of communities within a nation, in that the structural
characteristics governing a community or region, whether formal or informal, can
increase or decrease the flow of resources to specific demographics.
With this in mind, the fourth regression analysis (below) will attempt to
demonstrate the degree of interaction between microfinance institutions, controlling for
type of MFI, and the institutional environment in which they operate. In this vein of
reasoning, the broad research question for the following analyses is: in what capacity
does the institutional environment, in conjunction with the level of development of each
country, influence the average loan balance of microfinance institutions? For this model,
the following hypothesis will be tested: those MFIs that operate in a more democratic
environment and have greater access to capital (also assuming this environment affords
the opportunity for more liberalized monetary policies) will have larger average loan
balances than those MFIs operating in autocratic conditions. The institutional
environment will be measured in this section by country characteristics that are
considered relevant measures of the overall development of a country. Specifically, these
include variables from the World Bank and polity scores.
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For the final regression analysis of this piece, the following model will be
employed, adapting village level fixed effects outline used by McIntosh, de Janevry, and
Sadoulet (2005) to the legal type of microfinance institutions, while controlling for
country characteristics that are accepted as baseline indicators of development, in terms
of government, financial systems and structures, and societal indicators.
Model Four: Ojt = αt + fj +βAjt + θA2jt + βlegalClegaljt + ClegaljtZjϒlegal + εjt
Where:
j: Microfinance Institution
t: year
z: country characteristics 6
GDP per capita
Infant Mortality of children under 5 (per 1,000 births)
Polity: Institutionalized Democracy
Polity: Regulation of Participation and Expression of Political Preferences
Polity: Competitiveness of Participation (degree of civil interaction)
Real Interest Rate (%)
Net Domestic Credit
Broad money (% of GDP)
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)
Legal:
Bank
Credit Union/Cooperative
Non Bank Financial Institution
Non Government Organization
Rural Banks
Other

6

Definitions and Summary Statistics by Region for the country characteristics included in these models are included in
Appendix D and E, respectively.
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Table 4.2.4 Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed-Effects
Model with Country Variables (Model Four)
Dependent Variable:
Explanatory Variables:
Profit Margin
Gross Loan Portfolio
Risk Coverage
Operational Self Sufficiency
Years in Operation
Number of Active Borrowers
Offices
Miss_Offices
Age_Young
Age_Mature
Legal_Cooperative
Legal_NBFI
Legal_NGO
Legal_Rural Bank
Region_East Asia
Region_Eastern Europe
Region_LAC
Region_MENA
Region_South Asia
Scale_Medium
Scale_Large
Regulated_No
ProfitStatus_Profit
TargetMarket_Highend
TargetMarket_Lowend
TargetMarket_Smallb
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $)
Mortality rate, children under-5 (per 1,000 live
births)
Polity: Institutionalized Democracy
Polity: Regulation of Participation and Expression
of Political Preferences
Polity: Competitiveness of Participation (degree of
civil interaction)
Real Interest Rate (%)
Net Domestic Credit (scaled by 1,000,000,000)
Broad money (% of GDP)
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of
GDP)
Rho

Average Loan Balance
(Obs: 8,657)
(Groups: 1,580)
0.1240
0.2289
-0.0002209
-32.1878
-7.5723
-0.001362
1.3720
76.8296
-30.9564
6.7874
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
{omitted}
-57.1965
-53.0634
{omitted}
{omitted}
1,507.1950
-354.0771
4,369.8300

1.841
0.023 ***
0.00196
26.158
15.215
0.000186 ***
0.280 ***
56.619
103.001
68.971

0.5451
6.8779

0.035 ***
3.949 *

72.024
96.750

123.960 ***
73.590 ***
167.693 ***

12.6126
62.2054

26.966
53.066

-76.1655

71.703

-2.9547
-4,040
7.5572
8.1476

2.712
1,140 **
4.502 *
2.881 **

0.8195

Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Omitted variables are included in and accounted for by the fixed effect
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The predictive power of Model Four (0.8195) is greater than that of the previous
three models. This indicates that this particular model allows for an increased
understanding of the variance within the explanatory variables in relationship to the
average loan balance of MFIs than in the previous models. As this model controls for
country level factors which may be influencing the movement of average loan balance, in
either a positive or negative direction, this model particularly informs the discussion
surrounding mission drift and potential institutional level influences on this phenomenon.
Those continuous variables with a significant interaction to average loan balance
in Model One remain as such in terms of significance and directionality, with the
exception of years of operation. Gross Loan Portfolio, Number of Active Borrowers, and
Offices continue to have a significant relationship to average loan balance, including
nearly identical coefficients and degree of significance as in Model One. As in the
previous three models, as the gross loan portfolio of the organization increases, the
average loan balance the microfinance institution increases. Falling in line with the
previous discussions, as the average loan balance of the institution is estimated to
decrease as the number of active borrowers within the organization increases. Finally,
there is a positive correlation between the number of offices an organization maintains
over time and the average loan balance distributed to its active clients.
It is assumed in the theoretical discussion that welfarist organizations will have a
greater number of offices because they are also serving a greater number of borrowers at
a particular time. However, this does not seem to be the case in this analysis. Instead,
regardless of institutional type, as the number of offices increases across time, all else
equal, the average loan balance of that organization also increases.
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The target market of the organization, when compared to MFIs that direct their
services to a broad market, follows the same pattern of estimation found in Model One,
including the directionality and value of the resulting coefficients. High End and Small
Business targeting MFIs have a positive relationship to ALB, compared to those
classified as targeting a broad spectrum, all else equal; on average, those MFIs classified
as Low End have a negative and significant relationship with ALB over time. In terms of
other categorical variables of previous significance, the interaction of age and scale to
ALB is no longer recorded as such, compared to Model One.
Several macro-level variables included in Model Four seem to have a relationship
or interaction with average loan balance in this iteration. GDP per capita, mortality rate,
children under-5 (per 1,000 live births), broad money (% of GDP), and domestic credit
provided by banking sector (% of GDP) have a significant and positive relationship to
ALB, all else equal. On average, an increase in GDP per capita across the panel is
associated with an increase in average loan balance for MFIs in the sample, all else equal.
Average loan balance is estimated to increase as the mortality rate (children under-5 (per
1,000 live births)) within the country increases, holding all covariates constant. Average
loan balance is estimated to increase for each percent increase in broad money, as a
percentage of GDP, holding all other explanatory variables constant. Domestic credit
provided by the banking sector (% of GDP), has a similar relationship to ALB, on
average. Average loan balance is estimated to decrease for each one-percent increase in
Net Domestic Credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP), all else equal.
Broad money as a percentage of GDP and domestic credit provided by banking
sector (% of GDP) both influence the flow of capital in the formal market, which was
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discussed in the theoretical section of the review of literature. It would seem that as the
average loan balances distributed by MFIs increase over time, so do these measures of
capital flows in the formal market. The results of the interaction of these variables with
ALB support the idea that increased levels of capital in the formal market positively
influence the flows of capital to semi- or informal banking organizations, such as MFIs.
Given that the mortality rate of developed countries is less than that of developing
countries, the interaction between this variable and ALB is complex. As mortality rate
increases across time, ALB also increases, for the countries included in the analysis. This
would be the opposite direction or effect of mortality rate than would be optimally
desired overall. Reverse causality may be present within the interaction between average
loan balance and infant mortality in that institutions are lending to specific demographics
because of issues affecting these households such as child mortality.
This may also simply be explained by the fact that countries that have reduced
levels of infant mortality are not included in this study, thereby inflating the level of this
rate in the analysis. Those countries presently included in the analysis are also considered
developing or transitioning nations, which have a much higher rate of child mortality
compared to developed nations but, on the whole, has been in decline globally.
Specifically, this figure may be skewed in a negative direction due to the influence of
regions included that have a much higher infant mortality rate. Table 4.2.5 shows that this
average is influenced heavily by those countries within the Sub-Saharan region.
Specifically, Sierra Leone (204), Mali (192), Chad (178), Democratic Republic of Congo
(177), Angola (171), and Guinea-Bissau (171) have the highest infant mortality rate
among children under five within this region.
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Table 4.2.5: Average Infant Mortality Rate by Regional Classification
Infant Mortality Rate
(under 5, per 1,000 births)
n:
587
Mean:
117.62
S.D.:
35.92
Min:
41.5
Max:
230
n:
404
Mean:
29.66
S.D.:
20.63
Min:
5.3
Max:
94.7
n:
502
Mean:
28.64
S.D.:
16.31
Min:
8.7
Max:
160.7
n:
63
Mean:
36.73
S.D.:
19.71
Min:
9.3
Max:
95.1
n:
373
Mean:
66.98
S.D.:
20.07
Min:
12.2
Max:
129.2

Region

Sub-Saharan Africa
(36 Countries)

East Asia and the Pacific
(13 Countries)

Latin America and The Caribbean
(25 Countries)

Middle East and North Africa
(10 Countries)

South Asia
(7 Countries)

Overall, Model Four reframes the basic fixed-effects regression used in Model
One, taking into account the institutional environment of the microfinance institutions
using country level variables. This model attempts to measure the influence of spillover
effects from the formal market into the microfinance industry. It seems that in this sample
as the level of development increases within a country so does the average loan balance
of microfinance institutions operating within that same nation. This broadly validates the
assumption that the institutional environment influences the outcomes of microfinance
institutions, in terms of fulfilling the mission of the organization.
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4.3 Implications and Basic Conclusions of Analyses
The preceding regression analyses inform the understanding surrounding
characteristics of microfinance institutions that influence how average loan balance
changes over time and what this means in terms of mission drift for microfinance
institutions, on the individual level and as an industry. As microfinance institutions grow
over time in this sample, as measured by the number of active borrowers and gross loan
portfolio, they seem to shift more towards an institutionalist philosophy of lending,
validating the premise that such organizations tend to lend larger amounts to fewer
borrowers. As the legal or charter status does not change in this sample and is accounted
for in the fixed effect of the regression analyses, one cannot specifically infer the degree
of this broad shift in mission within a particular category of institution, as specified by
the MIXMarket classifications. However, specific characteristics and measures of these
broad classifications found in the literature (welfarist and institutionalist) surrounding
microfinance indicate that the majority of institutions are lending more money to fewer
clients across time.
Model One provides a baseline discussion of the interaction between average loan
balance an organizational characteristics that influence the outcome of microfinance
institutions; in addition to the basic explanatory variables, several categorical variables
were included to better inform the discussion. As seen in Table 4.3.6, Gross Loan
Portfolio, Years in Operation, the Number of Active Borrowers, Offices and Offices
missing have a significant interaction with average loan balance, all else equal.
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Table 4.3.6: Synopsis of Significant Interactions in Regressions (Models One
through Four)
Model

One: Basic Model

Two: First Difference

Three: Direction of Change

Four: Institutional Environment

Significant Explanatory Variables
(Continuous)
Gross Loan Portfolio
Years in Operation
Number of Active Borrowers
Offices
Offices Missing
Gross Loan Portfolio
Gross Loan Portfolio
Operational Self-Sufficiency
Years in Operation
Number of Active Borrowers
Offices
Offices Missing
Gross Loan Portfolio
Number of Active Borrowers
Offices

Transforming the dependent variable by taking the first difference results in a significant
interaction with only gross loan portfolio, in the second model. However, the variance
explained by this regression was predominantly controlled by the large values related to
gross loan portfolio. In Model Three, the direction of this change yielded significant
results for the same variables as Model One, while also influencing the operational selfsufficiency of the organization. This regression also allows for greater explanation of
mission drift within the organizations in this sample.
From the results in Model Four, we can conclude that there is a positive
correlation between the level of economic development of a country and the average loan
balance of the microfinance institutions in these data; as the basic measures of economic
growth used in this model increase, the average loan balance of microfinance institutions
operating within this environment also increase. With the exception of infant mortality
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rate, as development increases, including the absorptive capacity of the institutional
environment and social capital, so does the average loan balance of microfinance
institutions. This supports the assumption that as the microfinance industry evolves
within an ever changing institutional environment, this metamorphosis is leaning more
towards an institutionalist philosophy of lending. The degree or level of liberalization
within an economy, measured by the polity data, did not yield significant results.
Given that an increase in average loan balance, controlling for institutional factors
influencing the outcomes of the organization, indicates alignment with the institutionalist
philosophy of lending, one can conclude from these regression models that average loan
balance is increasing across the sample; as it does, there is a positive relationship between
the overall loan portfolio of the organization and the number of offices it maintains. As
the average loan balance of an organization increases, the number of active borrowers it
serves decreases.
These results support the basic hypothesis that microfinance, as an industry, is
drifting toward an institutionalist philosophy of lending. As discussed in the introduction,
these data are heavily influenced by the organizational capacity of the MFI remitting
information to MIXMarket. One can assume that these organizations have the
administrative resources to assemble the necessary information to create a profile with
MIXMarket. This omits a large subset of small MFIs that may not have sufficient staff or
capacity to collect the necessary data to create a profile with MIXMarket. This can also
potentially explain why those countries with a more developed institutional environment
have higher average loan balances. These same MFIs with the administrative capabilities
to remit information to MIXMarket, may also be operating in an institutional
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environment that could be considered more developed than those organizations that are
not, or cannot, submit information to this clearinghouse.
Given these assumptions, this sample may be skewed towards an institutionalist
perspective upon submission of the data, assuming that welfarist organization may have
decreased levels of organizational and administrative capacity. This difference may also
be explained in that those welfarist organizations submitting information are subsidized
by grants or other sources of funding in some way so that they can maintain a specific
level of services to their borrowers. In addition, MFIs serving the core poor may be
underrepresented in this sample, as these institutions may be considered welfarist and, as
previously discussed may not have the administrative support necessary to remit
information to MIXMarket. Regardless, one must keep in mind that this sample of MFIs
may not provide a true representation of the breadth of services offered by microfinance
institutions across the globe, including those that choose to concentrate on offering
services such as savings or insurance.
In terms of documenting mission drift in this sample, the results of the preceding
models indicate that a positive shift in average loan balance exists on both the intensive
and extensive margins for the MFIs in this sample, showing that these organizations are
drifting towards the institutionalist philosophy of lending on multiple levels. In terms of
the intensive margin of change, as age or years of operation increase so does average loan
balance; similarly, as MFIs grow in terms of scale, average loan balance also increases.
This indicates a shift in the services provided or the intended outcome of MFIs; an
organization can classify operations as large while still disseminating smaller loans to the
chosen target market. Conversely, a small organization may distribute larger loans, given
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that this reflects their mission. Regardless of scale, the outcome of the organizations
included in this analysis is shifting toward an institutionalist philosophy of lending, as
measured by average loan balance. On the extensive margin, newer MFIs, as represented
in these data, are providing microcredit services under the provision of an institutionalist
mission more often than the welfarist perspective. This can be framed in either a positive
or negative perspective, but regardless of the voice chosen, a shift is occurring within
these institutions in terms of the services offered and the demographic of households
receiving these services. The next chapter will provide a summary of the dissertation,
present policy implications, and provide a discussion of the limitations of the present
research and plans for future research on the topics included in this piece.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Future Research
5.1 Dissertation Summary
The mission of microfinance institutions and the manner in which the adopted
mission of each institution impacts the broad outcome of the organization sparks an
intense debate as to the service these institutions provide to the targeted demographic of
households. As discussed in the previous sections, a schism exists between two opposing
viewpoints which attempt to explain the link between intention and outcome by way of
organizational mission. From the welfarist perspective, the mission of the organization
directs resources to the poorest households in a community and the services provided are
tailored to meet the needs of these households. Institutionalist organizations seek to
provide such services to impoverished households in a sustainable manner; this impacts
the target demographic of the organization and creating a viable financial institution
becomes the primary focus of the organization.
Using average loan balance and the corresponding legal status of the organization
as the gauge of a microfinance institution’s mission, the preceding regression analyses
attempted to address the following research question: given that a positive, overall shift in
average loan balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, how does this impact
microfinance institutions and the demographics they target on the intensive and extensive
margins? There is no difference across the types of MFIs in this sample in terms of
average loan balance; the dependent variable is increasing across the majority of the
sample on both the intensive and extensive margins. More specifically, approximately
68% of the time this variable is moving in a positive direction across time. However,
particular factors seem to influence the direction of this change, including gross loan
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portfolio, number of active borrowers, age of the organization, scale of operations, and
the target market for the organization. These variables are of interest because they reflect
the mission of the organization in terms of the welfarist versus institutionalist philosophy
of lending.
On average, in this sample, microfinance institutions are disseminating larger
loans to recipients, regardless of institutional or legal type, be that welfarist or
institutionalist. Instead of following the life-cycle of MFIs as discussed in the theoretical
consideration sections, which involves entering the market as welfarist institution and
evolving toward the institutionalist philosophy of lending, newer organizations are
adhering to an institutionalist philosophy of lending from the date that they are
established. This demonstrates a twofold shift in the dissemination of microcredit, both
within organizations and in the organizational environment. As seen through all four
regression models, average loan balance is increasing and the target market served is
drifting toward the high end and small business loans, as opposed to a broad client base,
which falls in line with the institutionalist philosophy of lending.
This shift in target demographic, from serving the “poorest of the poor” to those
living just below the poverty line, moves beyond the general rift in organizational
philosophy. Microfinance organization now target and assist the entrepreneurial poor at a
greater rate than the core poor, as it is assumed that the entrepreneurial poor hold less risk
and have higher rates of repayment. It seems that microfinance institutions have become
more concerned with patterning their services after those of the formal financial market,
in terms of risk, repayment and organizational sustainability through services offered,
than extending financial services to an underserved demographic such as the core poor.
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This movement may be a result of pressure from board members or managerial staff to
create a self-sustaining financial institution; this pressure increases the likelihood that an
organization chooses to adhere to the institutionalist philosophy of lending as it provides
a higher rate of return to the lending entity, as discussed in the theoretical considerations
section.
As a development tool, the overall impact in reducing the level of poverty of
clients through access to microcredit comes into question, as the poorest households are
no longer served by MFIs who adopt an institutionalist mission. Although this critique
may seem negative since MFIs are still assisting households in general, it is necessary to
address such a shift as extremely impoverished households remain unable to meet basic
needs. Microfinance was also considered a panacea of sorts for the “poorest of the poor”
but seems to be of greater assistance to those individuals and households just below the
poverty line. This shift, ultimately a reflection of the schism of microfinance, leaves room
for a new level of evolution for these organizations, should donors and managers choose
to refocus on the core poor.
Secondarily, when the poorest households are served by MFIs, as in welfarist
organizations, they are not necessarily using the capital borrowed towards the creation of
a profit-generating small business, thus, making repayment difficult if it is used for
purely consumption smoothing purposes. This use of loans also undermines the intended
outcome of these organizations, as they seek to not only assist the core poor but wish to
do so by generating small business opportunities in local communities so as to create
sustainable sources of income for these households creating positive spillover effects for
these organizations. The risk associated with core poor households seems to be
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outweighing the philanthropic intent of these organizations and microfinance institutions
are lending to the entrepreneurial poor at a greater rate as a result.
The shift in mission toward the institutionalist philosophy seems logical in
generating a sustainable model of for development based financial institution; however,
given that this ideology also theoretically crowds out lending to the core poor, mission
drift has negative effects in providing financial services to extremely impoverished
households. While the addition of institutionalist microfinance organizations to the semiformal banking market adds opportunity to access financial services, it still
predominantly excludes the poorest households. Perhaps this shift lends itself to a new
level in the evolution of microfinance, where welfarist organizations will concentrate on
consumption-smoothing based services, still targeted services to the core poor in order to
mitigate budgetary shocks through savings and insurance opportunities like health
savings accounts instead of primarily offering microloans.
Microfinance as an industry is changing. As discussed at length per the review of
theoretical arguments and regression analyses, organizations are moving toward an
institutionalist philosophy of lending, as measured by the average amount disseminated
by the organizations in the sample used. This shift is occurring not only in existing MFIs
but also in new MFIs entering the market. The change in ideology calls into question the
impact of offering microcredit to poor households, as it can be argued that this service no
longer assists the poorest of the poor as was originally intended.
5.2 Policy Implications
The policy environment in terms of regulation (or lack thereof) has a direct
impact on the efficiency of microfinance institutions in terms of scale benefits and size,

103

which are linked to the cost functions for MFIs. As discussed in the theoretical
considerations section and examined through Model Four, a liberalized policy framework
can introduce the necessary regulations for the financial markets of developing countries
to enter into international exchange while simultaneously reducing the breadth of services
offered by commercial banks to the “risk-less” populace. This excludes a vast portion of
potential loan recipients due to the perceived risk held by impoverished households that
hold reduced levels of or no collateral.
The challenge for policymakers in terms of supporting programs such as
microfinance is to ensure that the policies providing monetary or infrastructure support to
these organizations are targeting aid toward the intended policy outcomes. As
microfinance is seen as a means to combat poverty, the target of these aid dollars falls
into two distinct camps: increasing income or reducing poverty, which in some cases are
mutually exclusive (Wright, 2000). Microfinance works within the context of this
framework when services offered by the lending institution decrease the overall
budgetary fluctuations of loan-receiving households (Wright, 2000; Hulme and Mosley,
1997; Sharma and Buchenreider, 2002).
The long-term impact of microfinance hinges on the overall sustainability of the
services provided to clients and the sustainability of the institution itself. Ultimately,
microcredit and microbanking services should increase the overall potential of the
households receiving this assistance, in order to use the capital in creating lasting sources
of income. Effectively including the poor in financial markets benefits the entire
economic system of a developing nation by increasing these households’ ability to
manage shocks and crises which cannot otherwise be provided for at the federal level due
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to a general scarcity of public funds allocated to social welfare programs (Zeller, 2001;
IFAD, 2003; Christen, Lauer, Lyman and Rosenberg, 2011). As such, microfinance can
be used as a tool by the policy makers within a developing nation to assist households
living below the poverty line in creating new and sustainable sources of income.
5.3 Limitations and Future Research
A main limitation of the regression analyses in this piece is the sample used, as
discussed at length in Section 3.2. A richer analysis of microfinance institutions could be
performed should a greater degree of information regarding welfarist organizations
become available. Also, obtaining and using the average interest rate of these
organizations across time, regardless of charter type or legal classification, would greatly
inform the discussion based upon the theoretical considerations and discussion
surrounding the impact of maintaining an optimal interest rate on organizational selfsufficiency. Finally, endogeneity is an issue in this study, again, linked to the sample used
for the analysis. As the data remitted to MIXMarket are self-reported by the MFIs
included in the sample, information entry errors may be present due to operator error or
incorrect information may intentionally have been submitted to the clearinghouse.
In terms of future research, the relationship between the average loan balance and
interest rate of the organization is vital in the discussion of mission drift within
microfinance institutions; future studies on these topics will include interest rate as an
explanatory variable if at all possible. Also, directly linking the concepts an organization
discusses in terms of the words used in the mission statement to the average loan balance
of the organization, classification of the organization itself (welfarist v. institutionalist
charter type), and other explanatory variables reflecting the health of the organization,
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would provide a richer discussion as to how the mission of microfinance organizations
influences, or does not impact, the intended outcome of the organization.
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Appendix A: Complete list of MFIs with altered date established
The following is a comprehensive list of the microfinance institutions that submitted a
date established (“date_est”) which is after the years of data (year) submitted to
MIXMarket (117 observations in the data). This variable was used to calculate the
approximate age of the MFIs in the dataset (“years_operating”) and is shown below prior
to the adjustments made as described in the text.
MFI Name
ACLEDA Lao
ACRG
AgroCredit
ALIDÃ©
Almaz
AREGAK UCO
Ascend Nigeria
Asirvad
Azeri Star
BancamÃa
BJS
BPR NBP 2
BRAC - LBR
BRAC - UGA
Buksh Foundation
CARD AgroCredit
CF Lanka
Chaitanya
CLECAM Wisigara
COAC Padre Vicente
Contigo Microfinanzas
Cordial Microfinanzas
CRAC Nuestra Gente
Dastras
Ehyoi kuhiston
EREL Bank
Express Finance
Farm Credit Armenia
Farz Foundation
FIDES Bank Namibia
FM Bank
GAMIFI SA
Garant-Invest

Year
2007
2005
2007-2008
2003-2005
2008
2005
2004-2006
2006
2002
2007
2005
2005
2008
2004-2005
2008
2006-2007
2004-2006
2008
2007
2007
2009
2006
2007
2008
2006
2009-2011
2003-2006
2006
2008
2009
2009
2007
2006
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date_est
1/1/2008
4/1/2006
9/1/2009
1/14/2006
9/27/2009
5/1/2006
1/27/2007
8/29/2007
5/1/2003
1/1/2008
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/22/2009
1/1/2006
1/1/2009
7/1/2008
9/3/2007
3/31/2009
1/1/2008
12/5/2008
4/30/2010
3/1/2007
1/1/2008
7/27/2009
2/6/2007
1/1/2012
7/24/2007
9/18/2007
9/9/2009
1/2/2010
2/23/2010
2/1/2009
9/25/2007

MFI Name
GTFS
HELP
Hilola Invest
IIFC Group
Imdodi Rushd
ImerCredit
IMHOKHAI FARMERS INITIATIVE
Imodi Hutal
Inam
Izdiharona Microfinance
Izzat Ravshan
Juhudi Kilimo
Kashf Bank
KEEF
KixiCredito
ltayskiy Fond Mikrozaymov
MCO Orlan
Microfin Plus
Microfinance Kyrgyzstan
MIKROFIN
MLO 'Saodat Invest'
NRSP Bank
Opportunity Tanzania
OXUS - AFG
Podemos Progresar
Regional Development Bank
Sahayata
Saija
Samrudhi MicroFin
SOFIPE SARL
Sonata
SPBD Fiji
STU
Sugd Microfin
SVSDF
TDMN
UFSPL
Utkarsh
VFS
WHO
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Year
2008
2009-2010
2007
2009
2008
2002-2006
2010
2006
2008
2007
2009-2010
2008
2007
2003
2005
2010-2011
2003
2008-2010
2009-2011
1997-1998
2005-2007
2010
2004-2006
2005-2006
2009
2008-2009
2005
2008
2006
2009
2005
2009
2010
2006
2007
2007
2008
2008
2002-2005
2003-2005

date_est
7/17/2009
7/19/2011
4/15/2008
1/6/2010
3/10/2009
12/3/2007
10/31/2011
7/1/2007
4/1/2009
6/1/2008
8/15/2011
4/1/2009
6/1/2008
1/1/2004
1/1/2006
7/11/2012
1/1/2004
7/19/2011
4/16/2012
1/1/1999
5/2/2008
3/1/2011
12/1/2007
1/1/2007
2/5/2010
3/1/2010
1/1/2006
1/1/2009
1/1/2007
1/1/2010
1/1/2006
10/18/2010
9/6/2011
1/1/2007
4/2/2008
11/30/2008
1/2/2009
8/5/2009
1/23/2006
1/1/2006

MFI Name
WMN (Russia)
WODASS
Yengil Kredit

Year
date_est
1999-2001
6/30/2005
2008-2010
10/8/2011
2008
1/23/2009
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Appendix B: MFIs without date established
The following organizations did not remit a date established as a section of their profile
information. The date established was assigned as January 1 of the first year in which the
organization submitted data to MIXMarket. This was done for 130 organizations (429
observations) and a complete list is below.
MFI Name

Years

Established

Country

AFS

2003-2010

1-Jan-03

Afghanistan

Arthacharya

2002-2010

1-Jan-02

Sri Lanka

WWI - AFG

2004-2010

1-Jan-04

Afghanistan

MoFAD

2005-2010

1-Jan-05

Afghanistan

NRDSC

2003-2011

1-Jan-03

Nepal

AMFI

1-Jan-04

Afghanistan

1-Jan-99

Armenia

CSI

2004-2010
1999-2006
2009-2010
1998-2001

1-Jan-98

Belarus

Parwaz

2003-2010

1-Jan-03

Afghanistan

SINERGIJA

2003-2011

1-Jan-03

Bosnia and Herzegovina

CMEDFI

2002-2011

1-Jan-02

Philippines

AKRSP

1997-2001

1-Jan-97

Pakistan

FUNDENUSE

2003-2011

1-Jan-03

Nicaragua

ARMP

2003-2009

1-Jan-03

Afghanistan

EDPYME Proempresa

1997-2011

1-Jan-97

Peru

ZECLOF

2000-2003

1-Jan-00

Zimbabwe

ASDEB

1999-2001

1-Jan-99

Togo

MUFFA

2001-2003

1-Jan-01

Cameroon

FDEA

2011

1-Jan-11

Senegal

CFA
UBPR- Union des Banques Populaires du
Rwanda
PACT - Myanmar

2005-2011

1-Jan-05

Afghanistan

2004-2005

1-Jan-04

Rwanda

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Myanmar (Burma)

Tadhamon

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Yemen

MICREDITO

2006-2011

1-Jan-06

El Salvador

NBJK

2011

1-Jan-11

India

MUFEDE

2008-2010

1-Jan-08

Burkina Faso

MADRAC

2005-2010

1-Jan-05

Afghanistan

WOCCU - AFG

2005-2010

1-Jan-05

Afghanistan

Sunduq

2005-2009

1-Jan-05

Afghanistan

Credex

2010

1-Jan-10

Mexico

RB Capalonga

2006

1-Jan-06

Philippines

BPR BCS

2006

1-Jan-06

Indonesia

BPR WRD

2006

1-Jan-06

Indonesia

AREGAK
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MFI Name

Years

Established

BPR AMJ

2006

1-Jan-06

Indonesia

BPR ANug

2006

1-Jan-06

Indonesia

BJS

2011

1-Jan-11

India

NCS

2011

1-Jan-11

India

SU

2010

1-Jan-10

India

CCSF

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Cambodia

East Mamprusi Comm Bank

2009-2010

1-Jan-09

Ghana

CPC-ADIM

2006-2007

1-Jan-06

Guinea-Bissau

REMEC NIAYES

2011

1-Jan-11

Senegal

ACFIME-CREDO

2010

1-Jan-10

Burkina Faso

MECAP

2011

1-Jan-11

Senegal

UMECAS

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Senegal

URMECS

2011

1-Jan-11

CHWDA

2007-2011

1-Jan-07

PCWDA

2008-2011

1-Jan-08

YYWDA

2007-2011

1-Jan-07

JXWDA

2007-2008
2010-2011

1-Jan-07

XXWDA

2007-2011

1-Jan-07

RB Malabang

2011

1-Jan-11

Senegal
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
Philippines

RB San Jacinto

2006-2008

1-Jan-06

Tianjin

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Degaf

2008-2009

1-Jan-08

Philippines
China, People's Republic
of
Ethiopia

Adok Timo

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Kenya

CEFOR

2011

1-Jan-11

Madagascar

Finance Invest NBCO

2008-2010

1-Jan-08

Nanzhao FPC

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Sahara Utsarga

2011

1-Jan-11

Azerbaijan
China, People's Republic
of
India

Harmos

2008-2009

1-Jan-08

Zambia

Pundutso

2008-2009

1-Jan-08

Zimbabwe

PEBCO

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Benin

Ezi Savings and Loan

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Ghana

COOPEC KOZIBI

2007-2011

1-Jan-07

Rwanda

COOPEC UBAKA

2007-2011

1-Jan-07

Rwanda

UCEA

2007-2011

1-Jan-07

Rwanda

Amalkom

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Iraq

BMT Sanama

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Indonesia

ASA-AFG

2008-2010

1-Jan-08

Afghanistan
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Country

MFI Name

Years

Established

Country

Nesie-meken

2008-2010

1-Jan-08

Kazakhstan

FESPROD

2008-2011

1-Jan-08

Benin

Fusion Microfinance

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Guangxi Longlin

2008-2011

1-Jan-08

Puyang RCC

2008-2011

1-Jan-08

AMANSIE WEST RB

2008-2010

1-Jan-08

India
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
Ghana

ANKOBRA WEST RB

2008-2010

1-Jan-08

Ghana

ASOKORE RB

2010

1-Jan-10

Ghana

Pacific S&amp;L

2011

1-Jan-11

Ghana

CDOT

2008-2011

1-Jan-08

India

INNOVATIVE FINANCE

2009

1-Jan-09

Ghana

ACCESS

2008-2011

1-Jan-08

BFI

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

Gansu Wushan URDA

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

MCPO Kai

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

JSSDA

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

LPAC

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Qinghai UNDP

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

YESC

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

Shanxi Jinzhong RPAA

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

YJRCDA

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

YMCREDA

2011

1-Jan-09

URDA

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Gansu Jishishan RDA

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

Guide RDA

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Guanling RDA

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Guizhou Xingren RDA

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Guizhou Ziyun RDA

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Yucheng FPC

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Guinan LPAC

2011

1-Jan-11

Jamaica
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
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MFI Name

Years

Established

Yi FPC

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

Laishui FPC

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

URSA

2011

1-Jan-11

Country
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
Comoros

USM

2011

1-Jan-11

Comoros

Progresso

2011

1-Jan-11

HanHua

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

JinjiLake

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Jinzhong

2011

1-Jan-11

Maanshan

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

MLC Jiangnan

2011

1-Jan-11

WHMLC

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

HARBEMCO

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Mozambique
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
China, People's Republic
of
Philippines

CMF Umurimo

2007-2011

1-Jan-07

Rwanda

SCDS

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

India

MEC FADEC

2011

1-Jan-11

Senegal

MEC PROPAS

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Senegal

Intellcash

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

India

Remu

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Kenya

GMSSS

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

India

Paypal Thrift and Loans

2008-2010

1-Jan-08

Nigeria

SSD

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

India

SDF

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

India

Multivest MFB

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Nigeria

Olubasiri MFB

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Nigeria

GODO

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

Suriname

COECEPT

2010-2011

1-Jan-10

Togo

RB Sugbuanon

2011

1-Jan-11

Keshiketeng RCU

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Perviy Primorskiy

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Philippines
China, People's Republic
of
Russia

ARGENTIFERE

2009-2011

1-Jan-09

Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
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Appendix C: Explanatory Variable Definitions
Variable
Average Loan
Balance ($US):
Profit Margin:

Gross Loan
Portfolio:
Risk Coverage:

Definition
Total value of outstanding loans divided by the number of clients served by
the MFI.*
Net Operating Income / Financial Revenue*
Net Operating Income: Financial Revenue - (Financial Expense +
Impairment Loss + Operating Expense) *
Financial Revenue: Revenues from the loan portfolio and from other
financial assets are broken out separately and by type of income (interest,
fee) *
All outstanding principal for all outstanding client loans, including current,
delinquent and restructured loans, but not loans that have been written off.
It does not include interest receivable. It does not include employee loans. *
Impairment Loss / (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days) *
Impairment Loss: The non-cash expense calculated as a percentage of the
value of the loan portfolio that is at risk of default. This value is used to
create or increase the impairment loss allowance on the balance sheet. *
Portfolio at Risk Greater than 30 Days: The value of all loans
outstanding that have one or more installments of principal past due
more than 30 days. This includes the entire unpaid principal balance,
including both the past due and future installments, but not accrued
interest. It also includes loans that have been restructured or rescheduled.
*

Operational Self
Sufficiency (%):

Years in
Operation:
Number of Active
Borrowers:

Offices:
Age:

Financial Revenue / (Financial Expense + Impairment Loss + Operating
Expense) *
Financial Revenue: Revenues from the loan portfolio and from other
financial assets are broken out separately and by type of income (interest,
fee) *
Financial Expense: These expenses will continue to be classified by
associated liability, but are also broken down by type of expense
(interest, fee) for each associated financial liability. *
Impairment Loss: The non-cash expense calculated as a percentage of the
value of the loan portfolio that is at risk of default. This value is used to
create or increase the impairment loss allowance on the balance sheet. *
Operating Expense: Expenses related to operations, including all
personnel expense, depreciation and amortization, and administrative
expense. *
The number of years in which an MFI has recorded operations, which was
calculated by subtracting the year established from the years that data were
submitted. Ɨ
The number of individuals or entities who currently have an outstanding
loan balance with the MFI or are primarily responsible for repaying any
portion of the Loan Portfolio, Gross. Individuals who have multiple loans
with an MFI should be counted as a single borrower.
The number of staffed points of service and administrative sites used to
deliver or support the delivery of financial services to microfinance clients.
MIX benchmark tables classify MFIs into three categories (new, young and
mature) based on the maturity of their microfinance operations. This is
calculated as the difference between the year they started their microfinance
operations and the year of data submitted by the institutions. *
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Variable

Definition
New
Young
Mature

1 to 4 years
5 to 8 years
More than 8 years

Scale*
Small
Medium
Large

Africa, Asia, ECA, MENA: less than 2 million borrowers
LAC: less than 4 million borrowers
Africa, Asia, ECA, MENA: 2 million – 8 million borrowers
LAC: 4 million to 15 million borrowers
Africa, Asia, ECA, MENA: greater than 8 million borrowers
LAC: greater than 15 million borrowers

Region*
Sub-Saharan
Africa
(36 countries, 587
MFIs)
East Asia and the
Pacific
(13 countries, 292
MFIs)
Eastern Europe
and Central Asia
(25 countries, 414
MFIs)
Latin America and
The Caribbean
(25 countries, 502
MFIs)
Middle East and
North Africa
(10 countries, 73
MFIs)
South Asia
(7 countries, 373
MFIs)

Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the, Congo, Republic of,
Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, The, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe Ɨ
Cambodia, China, People’s Republic of, East Timor, Fiji, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Thailand, Tonga,
Vietnam Ɨ
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,
Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Ɨ
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia,
Suriname, Trinidad, Uruguay, Venezuela Ɨ
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
Yemen Ɨ
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka Ɨ

Operations of the microfinance institution are regulated by a governing
body in the formal banking system; this is designated in the data as a
categorical variable and MFIs self-select “yes” or “no”.
MFIs indicate if their charter designates their profit status as for-profit or
Profit Status Ɨ
not-for-profit (“profit” or “non-profit” categories in the data).
Indicates the depth of services provided by the MFI, where Depth equals
*
Target Market
the ratio of Average Loan Balance to corresponding the GNI per Capita
Low End Depth <20% OR average loan size <USD 150
Broad Depth between 20% and 149%
High End Depth between 150% and 250%
Small Business Depth over 250%
*
Definition provided by MixMarket. Ɨ Definition or tabulation provided by the author
Regulated Ɨ
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Appendix D: Definitions of Country Level Variables
Country Level Variable
World Bank Variables:

GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $)

Mortality rate, children under-5 (per 1,000 live births)
Real Interest Rate (%)
Net Domestic Credit
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Broad money (% of GDP)

Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of
GDP)

Definition
GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing
power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as
the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of
natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars.
Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per
1,000 live births in a given year.
The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator.
The sum of net credit to the nonfinancial public sector, credit to the private sector, and
other accounts. Data are in current local currency.
Liquid liabilities are also known as broad money. They are the sum of currency and
deposits in the central bank, plus transferable deposits and electronic currency, plus time
and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and
securities repurchase agreements, plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits,
commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents.
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on
a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The
banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other
banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do not accept
transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits).
Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan institutions and
building and loan associations.

Country Level Variable
PolityTM IV Project Variables:

Institutionalized Democracy

Regulation of Participation and Expression of Political
Preferences
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Competitiveness of Participation (degree of civil
interaction)

Definition
Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence
of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences
about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil
liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other
aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances,
freedom of the press, and so on are a means to, or specific manifestations of, these
general principles.
Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and
how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both
regulate participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling
participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion;
the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for
political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no
enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political
activity
The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences
for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.

Appendix E: Summary Statistics for Country Variables
Country Variable:
Sub-Saharan Africa

East Asia and the
Pacific

Region
Eastern Europe and
Central Asia

Latin America and
The Caribbean

n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:

n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:

Middle East and
North Africa

South Asia

World Bank Variables:
GDP per capita, PPP
(constant 2005
international $)

Mortality rate, children
under-5
(per 1,000 live births)
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Real Interest Rate (%)

Net Domestic Credit
(scaled by $1,000,000)

Broad money (% of
GDP) **

Domestic credit
provided by banking
sector (% of GDP)
**

n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:

576
1,449
1,344
247
13,610
587
117
35
41
230
341
11.54
19.86
-17.12
508.74
567
1,638,224
2,944,125
-1,098,254
1.69e^07
567
29.86
12.37
4.84
151.55
567
26.21
28.20
-15.78
196.08

n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:

291
3,387
1,475
859
13,672
292
34
16
6.5
119
269
3.22
3.62
-15.68
28.54
288
4.55e^08
7.90e^08
-279
3.06^e09
287
69.35
43.61
10.48
180.78
287
59.67
38.99
-31.83
151.88

404
7,589
4,374
968
18,087
404
29
20
5
94
332
5.72
11.27
-71.20
97.47
349
2,949,153
4,930,586
200
2.22e^07
356
37.67
16.46
7.03
83.30
349
32.99
16.93
5.56
121.04

502
7,160
3,381
992
24,150
502
28
16
8.7
160
480
10.71
10.78
-18.90
93.91
502
1.35e^07
4.42e^07
1,554
2.55e^08
502
39.75
13.42
14.59
97.87
502
42.69
22.17
10.51
122.13

n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:

63
4,556
2,089
1,612
12,900
63
36
19
9.3
95
61
5.83
12.96
-15.35
66.27
63
4,674,719
2.05e^07
-2.57e^07
1.05e^08
63
73.56
47.93
18.86
238.56
63
73.56
47.93
-24.91
191.17

n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:
n:
Mean:
S.D.:
Min:
Max:

Zimbabwe in 2008 was excluded from this statistic as the value was recorded as 4,855,455,696,289,792 in the sample, which severely skewed the percentage.

372
2,027
930
568
5,095
373
66
20
12
129
370
4.62
4.51
-6.82
16.35
373
1.64e^07
2.02e^07
-25,510
6.65e^07
373
59.61
14.67
21.08
80.66
373
54.83
15.37
-4.41
75.12

Country Variable:

Region
Sub-Saharan
Africa

East Asia and
the Pacific

Eastern Europe
and Central Asia

Latin America
and The
Caribbean

Middle East and
North Africa

South Asia

Obs:
n:

Obs:
n:

Obs:
n:

Obs:
n:

Obs:
n:

PolityTM IV Project Variables:
Institutionalized Democracy

Obs:
n:
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-88
-77
-66
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Regulation of Participation and
Expression of Political Preferences

60
83
47
37
85
51
59
144
140
20
Obs:
n:

-88
-77
-66
0
1
2
3
4
5

794
585
37
31

731
585
37
31

325
290

93
2
18
3
2
3
29
174
1
Obs:
n:

320
290

Obs:
n:

550
414
17
16
106
46
21
20
1
128
61
36
28
55
15
495
414
17

725
498
18
7

7

Obs:
n:

10
1
57
61
155
252
130
27
550
498
18
7

16

345
270
48

2
179
48
91

166
220
61
15

464
29
32

99
63
1

571
373

14
27
33
8

18
58
29
21

12

46
158
65

4
175
Obs:
n:

108
63
1

Obs:
n:

463
373

14

18

17
60
16

319
101
25

Country Variable:

Region
Sub-Saharan
Africa

East Asia and
the Pacific

Eastern Europe
and Central Asia

Latin America
and The
Caribbean

Middle East and
North Africa

South Asia

Obs:
n:

Obs:
n:

Obs:
n:

Obs:
n:

Obs:
n:

PolityTM IV Project Variables (continued):
Competitiveness of Participation
(degree of civil interaction)

Obs:
n:
-88
-77
-66
0
1
2
3
4
5

715
585
37
31
73
1
75
189
309

297
290

4
91
3
6
193

466
414
17
16
21
33
73
101
190
15

587
498
18
17

187
343
32

101
63
1
14
11
3
22
42
8

514
373

18
3
58
164
271
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